The article examines the meaning of the other for Kant's idea of autonomy. Autonomy is interpreted, in relation to the universal demand of the ethical, as governing the will by principles. Autonomy as principled self-determination by means of the practical law cannot be understood as the standpoint of an isolated subject. Instead we must understand it as a standpoint taken towards others, which we treat as the aspect of spontaneity, and at the same time as a standpoint taken thanks to others, since others make possible its awakening and development - here the aspect of receptivity is discussed. In this two-way relation between autonomy (enabled by a self-determining goverment by principle) and the other, the character of dialogical mutuality is exhibited: autonomy is the principled considerateness of a good will towards others, and, in order for it to be such, it must be initiated by others., Ondřej Sikora., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
In this text we aim to analyze the Cartesian motifs in the “early” period of Emmanuel Levinas’s thought. Our goal is to explore whether Levinas’s Cartesianism is merely a singular phenomenon, or if it can be set into the wider current of “phenomenologi-cal Cartesianism”. In order to confirm the second possibility, it seems that we must reconstruct the motifs, continuing in Descartes’s specific line of argumentation, which we can directly designate as the “Cartesian way”. These Cartesian motifs can be found in Levinas’s wider context of the issue of subjectivity, and it is these deliberations that form the structure in which the famous formulation of the definition of infinity is made. The first text in which we attempt to identify this general structure that Des-cartes provides for Levinas’s thought and the function that it fulfills in it is Description of Existence. The second motif is Cartesian subjectivity in the book Existence and Existents.
Text se pokouší sledovat, jakým způsobem se významný český marxista meziválečného období Jaroslav Kabeš snažil rozpracovávat subjektivní stránku marxistické filosofie ve formě specifické etiky. Tuto jeho koncepci autor stati nazval „etikou vůle k přetvoření světa“. Kabešovo úsilí je v textu rámováno „krizí“ marxismu po říjnové revoluci, která vyvolala debatu o dalším směřování marxistické filosofie. Jednou z radikálních odpovědí na tuto situaci byla rehabilitace jejího revolučního charakteru skrze znovuoživení prvků hegelovské dialektiky v Marxových spisech (K. Korsch, G. Lukács). Kabeš se naopak obrátil k tradici voluntaristické filosofie (A. Schopenhauer, F. Nietzsche), ale rovněž k nejranějším Marxovým spisům a Leninově korespondenci, aby zde našel podněty pro svůj projekt materialisticky chápaného etického postoje. and The text attempts to follow the path that Jaroslav Kabeš, a notable Czech Marxist of the interwar period, took to work out the subjective side of Marxist philosophy in the form of a specific ethics. The article’s author calls Kabeš’ conception an “ethics of the will to transform the world.” Kabeš’ efforts are framed in the article by the “crisis” in Marxism that followed the October Revolution and which triggered a debate on the direction that Marxist philosophy should take in the future. One of the radical responses to this situation was to rehabilitate its revolutionary character by reviving the elements of Hegel’s dialectic in Marx’s writings (K. Korsch, G. Lukács). Kabeš, by contrast, turned not only to the philosophical tradition of voluntarism (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche) but also to the earliest writings of Marx and to Lenin’s correspondence so as to find the stimuli for his project of a materialistically understood ethical position.