The aim of the paper is to provide an interpretation of Schopenhauer’s criticism of Kantian philosophy in its three pivotal areas: the notion of metaphysics, the basics of epistemology and ethical theory. The study shows the grounding of this criticism in the rehabilitation of the world in its immediate givenness. The next point of discussion is an analogy of Schopenhauer’s ethics in relation to Kant, its inner contradiction related to the concepts of compassion and resignation, as well as their inspiring character. and Stať interpretuje hlavní body Schopenhauerovy kritiky Kantovy filosofie: koncept metafyziky, východiska teorie poznání a rozvrh etiky. Jejich společným jmenovatelem je rehabilitace bezprostředně daného světa, „v němž žijeme a jsme“. Spolu s tím se ukazuje jednak analogie Schopenhauerova projektu metafyziky vůle ke Kantově metafyzice autonomie, za druhé jeho rozporuplnost, projevující se zejména v motivech soucitu a rezignace, a nakonec inspirativní význam těchto motivů.
This study discusses the limits of Marx’s reinterpretation of Hegel’s conception of dialectics as a self-mediation of the fundamental by way of historical reality: we will show Marx’s disessentialisation of the (already quite monistic) Hegelian absolute spirit, and the consequences of Marx’s conception of consciousness as of a conscious being for the concept of culture, reduced that is to interest-conditioned, “ideological” praxis and its self-reflection. The study thus subjects to criticism the reduction of objectivi¬ty to totality in György Lukács, the founder of modern western Marxism; it points to the residuum (in no way objectively unlicensed) of self-positing subjecti¬vism in his “class-consciousness”; and it compares this immanentist conception with, on the one hand, the utopian conception of Ernst Bloch, foreshadowing Derrida’s stress on the auto criti¬cism of Marxism as a philosophy of the historicity of categories (as Lukács himself theo¬retically understood it!), and, on the other hand, with the dialectical non identity of the possible of Theodor W. Adorno. By reflecting on Marx’s concept of (historical) consciousness (of conscious Being) through critical insight into its most (in our view) signi¬ficant interpretations of the 20th century, the study attempts to capture the limi¬ts of the monistically-conceived dialectic for democratic social pra¬xis, preserving the “principle of hope” in the openness of the unsubsumable individual.
Popper opakovaně tvrdí, že aby teorie mohla rozvinout svůj plný potenciál, musí kritické fázi testování předcházet krátká dogmatická fáze. Někdy zachází Popper ještě dál a uznává dokonce nezbytnost dogmatismu pro rozvinutí kritického myšlení. To jsou znepokojivá tvrzení, která podrývají Popperův metodologický princip falsifi kace. Kritický racionalismus je založen na nesmiřitelném postoji k dogmatismu z logických důvodů (justifi kace je logicky neplatná), z evolučních důvodů (dogmatismus nepřispívá k růstu vědění) i z ideologických důvodů (dogmatismus je typický pro totalitární režimy). Popper není schopen defi novat žádné objektivní měřítko, jak by se měl dogmatismus správně dávkovat, a tak otvírá prostor pro jeho nekontrolovatelné šíření. Kritičnost tak přestává být nekompromisním normativním principem a konstitutivním rysem racionality. and At various occasions Popper states that in order for a theory to show its strength “certain amount” of dogmatism must precede the critical testing phase. He even argues that dogmatism is a necessary precondition of criticism. Th ese are alarming statements, undermining Popper’s methodological imperative of falsifi - cation. Critical rationalism is based on a strict opposition to dogmatism for logical reasons (justifi cation is impossible), for evolutionary reasons (justifi cation blocks the growth of knowledge), and for ideological reasons (dogmatism encourages totalitarianism). Popper cannot provide any objective criterion defi ning the proper dosage of dogmatism and thus opens doors to its uncontrolled expansion. Criticism thus ceases to be the non-negotiable normative principle and the inviolable standard of rationality.
This study seeks an answer to the question when and how the Czech romantic K. H. Mácha (1810–1836) started to be seen as a “modern” poet who could inspire authors writing decades after his death. The study proves that the image of “modern” Mácha as the first Czech poet to achieve the autonomy of art already existed between 1860 and 1890, and that Mácha’s artistic reputation grew constantly throughout the second half of the 19th century. This argument is based on a vast amount of evidence, mostly taken from literary journalism and criticism between 1858 and 1910 (the latter year seeing the centenary of Mácha’s birth).
This article affirms the modern origin of sociology as a science and posits a critical posture as its fundamental component. As such, sociology is opposed to any dogmatic conception of knowledge. The critical stance has both internal and external dimension. Sociology is under the obligation to observe a constant vigilance towards the knowledge it produces. A considerable methodological privilege bestowed upon the researchers in sociology requires that they have to be capable of criticizing their conceptual tools and operational procedures. Furthermore, critical attitude consists also in questioning conditioning of results linked to the dependence arising from the subsidizing of research. These preconditions of critical posture are illustrated by consideration of the challenges of researching the so-called “school failure”. Ultimately, responsibility commands a sociologist to respect the principle of precaution. When political action is concerned, the researchers must demand that their rights of intellectual property be preserved. To criticize, in this sense, is not to denounce; nonetheless, sociology will only remain faithful to what can pass legitimately as its essence by demanding the right, against threats and seductions, to speak the truth about social reality. and Claude Javeau.