First I present a puzzle involving two opaque objects and a shadow cast on the ground. After I offer a solution to this puzzle by identifying which of the objects is causally responsible for the shadow, I argue that this case poses a counterexample to David Lewis’s latest counterfactual account of causation, known as his in-fluence theory. Along the way, I discuss preemption, overdetermina-tion, absence causation, and trumping preemption.
Causal overdetermination - i.e. instances in which x, y, and z all occur and intuitively the occurrence of x alone is sufficient for the occurrence of z and the occurrence of y alone is sufficient for the occurrence of z - has long been considered a problem for counterfactual analyses of causation. Intuitively, we want to say both x and y caused z, but standard Lewisian counterfactual analysis yields the result that neither x nor y caused z. David Lewis, himself, suggested that overdetermination ought to be left as ''spoils to the victor''. I show how, if we modify Lewis’ account of events slightly, we can bring counterfactual analysis in line with our intuitions about overdetermination., Kauzální overdetermination - tj. Případy ve kterých x, y, a z všichni nastanou a intuitivně výskyt x sám je dostačující pro výskyt z a výskyt y sám je dostačující pro výskyt z - dlouho byl zvažován problém pro \ t kontrafaktuální analýzy příčin. Intuitivně chceme říci, že jak x, tak y způsobily z, ale standardní Lewisianova kontrafaktuální analýza dává výsledek, že ani x ani y nezpůsobily z. David Lewis, sám, navrhl, že nadměrné určování by mělo být ponecháno jako ,,kořist pro vítěze''. Ukazuji, jak kdybychom pozměnili Lewisův účet o událostech, můžeme přinést kontrafaktuální analýzu v souladu s našimi intuicemi o předávkování., and Dana Goswick
This article discusses the methodological aspects of Marx’s theoretical approach. It draws on the epistemology of Gaston Bachelard, and especially on the interpretation of Louis Althusser. It examines in detail Bachelard’s concepts of connaissance commune and epistemological rupture, and also Althusser’s distinction between “Generalities I” and “Generalities III”, while putting these concepts into the context of Marx’s critique of political economy. A significant focus here is also the distinction between “real object” and “the object of knowledge”, as well as the concepts of Darstellung, structural causality and overdetermination (surdétermination). The article demonstrates that Marx’s method of the historicising and denaturalising theoretical categories can be an effective instrument in de-ideologising the areas which Althusser characterises as “theoretical ideology”.