The concept of personal identity has recently come to play an increasingly important role in bioethical discussion concerning the beginning and end of human life. This study does not aim to represent the whole range of applications of theories of personal identity to bioethics. It focuses only on the beginning of human life, namely on the question of the moral acceptability of abortion. The author begins by describing an argument rejecting the acceptability of abortions which has been advanced by P. Lee, and it is shown that the validity of this argument depends on a certain conception of personal identity. Then the author briefly defines the psychological approach to personal identity, and he points to its weaknesses. There follows a discussion of the theory of animalism which claims that our persistence in time does not comprise any psychological factors. The conclusion of the article deals with various theories of moral status and indicates the inadequacy of functional criteria in accounting for the moral point of view. The article finishes by stating that the moral status of human beings should be founded on the concept of human dignity. If the considerations in the study have been set out correctly then they justify the following conclusion: abortions are morally unacceptable., David Černý., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Štúdia skúma spôsoby zdôvodňovania rozhodnutí slovenských súdov v prípadoch kolízie dvoch základných práv, slobody prejavu a osobnostných práv. Prostredníctvom obsahovej analýzy vybraných rozhodnutí slovenských súdov prevažne z rokov 2010–2013 sme rozobrali používanie (1) ontologických, tj. filozofických a teoretických zdôvodnení v prospech slobody prejavu, (2) uplatnenie princípu proporcionality a (3) odkazovanie na predpisy o ľudských právach, konkrétne na Ústavu SR a Európsky dohovor
o ľudských právach.Naše zistenia naznačujú, že v závislosti od spôsobu zdôvodňovania existujú dva odlišné prístupy súdov k rozhodovaniu pri konflikte týchto dvoch práv.Rozdiely medzi nimi sa najviac ukazujú pri
používaní druhého a tretieho spôsobu zdôvodnenia, keďže na skúmanej vzorke šesťdesiatich rozhodnutí sme zistili, že súdy, ktoré sa odvolávajú na tieto dve skupiny argumentov, častejšie rozhodnú v prospech slobody prejavu. Súvislosť medzi spôsobom zdôvodnenia a verdiktom rozhodnutia pri používaní ontologického zdôvodňovania je menej výrazná, paradoxne napriek tomu, že pomáha zdôrazniť dôležitosť práva na slobodu prejavu.Na záver naša štúdia poukazuje na možnosti ďalšieho výskumu týkajúceho sa vplyvu rozličných druhov zdôvodnenia na postavenie a význam práva na slobodu prejavu v Slovenskej republike. and This study examines how Slovak courts justify their decisions in the cases of conflicts of the two basic rights: freedom of speech and personal rights.Via content analysis of sixty verdicts issued by courts in 2010–2013, we analysed (1) the frequency of ontological argumentation, i.e. philosophical
and theoretical justifications of free speech, (2) application of the principle of proportionality and (3) reference to human rights provisions, namely the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.Our findings suggest that, depending on the method of reasoning, there are two different approaches of the courts to the conflicts between these two rights. The key difference lies in the application of the second and third type of justification, because the examination of our samples indicates that the courts, which use these two
arguments, are more often inclined to decide in favour of the free speech. The relationship between the type of justification and the verdict of the court by using the ontological justification is less pronounced, although, paradoxically, it helps to stress the importance of the right to free speech. In conclusion, our study outlines the possibilities of further research concerning the influence of the different forms of justifications on the position and strength of freedom of speech in Slovakia.