Preliminary results of an extended program of examination of the Ondřejov and Sonneberg plate collectons for possible optical counterparts to gamma-ray bursters are presented. One optical image was found on 3 different plates at the same position suggesting it may be related to gamma-ray burster 1979 March
25 B. Results of both archival and time-correlated searches are discussed for GRBS as well as for the Perseus Flasher.
Radial velocities of H2 - H9 abd Ca II K lines on 27 high dispersion (0.27 nm/mm) spectrograms of the HgMn-star Alpha Andromedae were measured, While radial velocities of Balmer lines show no significant changes, radial velocities of Ca II K line vary in the limits from 5 to 13 km/s. A frequency analysis of the Ca II K RV values leads to two different frequencies of 27.86 and 35.20 c/d. Their superposition results is a 196 min beat-phenomenon period. Halfwidth of the calcium line varies in the way which could be explained by nonradial oscillations.
Despite theoretical predictions on the existence of solar gravity oscillations (g modes), their detection is still marginal. The main reasons are their frequencies, ν<0.2 mHz, and amplitudes of
less than 10 cm/s. However, because these modes are extremely sensitive to the physical conditions in the very deep sun, they can give us detailed Information on the physics of the core. Using a resontant scattering spectrophotometer we measured the radial velocity of the Sun at the KI 769.9 nm. line with very high resolution and temporal stability. The observatíons carried out at Izaňa (Tenerife) continuously for the last three years, háve been used to search for solar g modes. Analysis of the whole lot of data as one single time series provides a spectral resolution of 12 nHz, and signal with amplitude above noise level, 1 cm/s. Several techniques are used in order to find.the signature of g modes and calculate the parameters Po and vr. Individua! peaks, well above noise level, are identified and their frequencies are likely to correspond with
g modes.
In searching both for food to produce eggs and for suitable oviposition sites, females of aphidophagous ladybirds must be adapted to exploit prey that vary greatly in their occurrence and abundance over both space and time. A simple model of ladybird searching and oviposition behaviour emerged in the 1950s: adult ladybirds are highly mobile in traversing the landscape, but become less active and produce more eggs as their rate of aphid consumption increases. The net result is that most eggs tend to be laid at sites of high aphid density. Laboratory and field experiments and observations over the past several decades have generally supported this basic model, although the linkage between ladybird dispersal activity and local aphid density often appears to be relatively weak. Not all ladybird eggs are laid in patches of high aphid density. Females use resources from limited prey consumption to produce eggs in modest numbers. They may thus be prepared to lay some eggs quickly when they succeed in finding aphids in high numbers, but otherwise they may have little choice but to lay these eggs in suboptimal sites. Upon locating patches of high prey density, females are faced with the decision of how long to remain. The basic model raises the possibility that these females become passively trapped at such patches until local aphid density collapses. Recent studies, however, suggest that detection of oviposition-deterring pheromones may promote earlier departure from prey patches. Females may also have an innate tendency to disperse throughout their lives regardless of local conditions, as a bet-hedging strategy to spread their eggs widely over space. Additional studies are needed to evaluate further the degree to which females actively determine and vary the rhythms of dispersal and reproduction in response to the unpredictable and short-lived nature of populations of their aphid prey
V568. Cyg has been observed photometrically, spectroscopically and photographically during a campaign on 0-B runaways. These may contain either postsupernova binaries or stars dynamically ejected. from young associations. Whereas even its variability was doubtful, we have recorded photometric minima deeper from V to U as well as strong inversion of colour indexes, the star becoming redder as the minimum gets deeper:
1986 (mean value) 1987 (mean value) July 30, 86 August 2,86
B-V - 0.26 - 0.23 + 1.74 + 1.62
U-B - 0.63 - 0.59 + 1.30 + 1.05
New transient Hα emission episodes have been observed. The equivalent widths of absorption lines of hydrogen, except Hα, change in a correlated way reaching their lowest value sometimes at photometric minima. Eclipse of a hot object with a possible disk, by a late type giant in an eccentric orbit, seems the most viable explanation. The ephemeris J.D. 2446641.5 + 152.12 days may help the search for further primary minima.
My aim is to show that once we appreciate how Searle (1958) fills in the details of his account of proper names - which I will dub the presuppositional view - and how we might supplement it further, we are in for a twofold discovery. First, Searle’s account is crucially unlike the so-called cluster-of-descriptions view, which many philosophers take Searle to have held. Second, the presuppositional view he did hold is interesting, plausible, and worthy of serious reconsideration. The idea that Searle’s account is a largely Fregean interlude between the Fregean description theory of proper names and Kripke’s proposals presented in ''Naming and necessity'' is in major ways a myth, a mythical chapter in how the story of 20th-century philosophy of language is often told., Mým cílem je ukázat, že jakmile oceníme, jak Searle (1958) zaplňuje podrobnosti svého účtu o vlastních jménech - které budu zpochybňovat presuppoziční pohled - a jak bychom jej mohli dále doplňovat, jsme pro dvojí objev. Za prvé, Searleův účet je zásadně na rozdíl od tzv. Shluku popisů, který si mnoho filozofů vezme Searle. Zadruhé, předvídavý pohled, který zastával, je zajímavý, hodnověrný a hodný vážného přehodnocení. Myšlenka, že Searleův účet je z velké části svobodnou překážkou mezi teorií Fregeanova popisu vlastních jmen a Kripkeho návrhů prezentovaných v ,,Pojmenování a nezbytnosti'', je v zásadě mýtem, mýtickou kapitolou o tom, jak je příběh filosofie jazyka 20. století. často., and Zsófia Zvolenszky
Searle’s conception of ontological emergence is a basis for his explanation of mind and consciousness in the physical world. In this article, I try to show that a closer examination uncovers some possible ambiguities in Searle’s conception of emergence. First, I try to show that Searle’s distinction between emergent1 and emergent2 leads to a distinction between a strong and a weak interpretation of a causal consequence of interactions among constitutive entities and that from this point of view the existence of emergent2 is improbable only in the strong sense. Second, I attempt to clarify Searle’s distinction between explanation and deduction of consciousness in his claim for the non-deducibility of consciousness . At the end I try to show in what sense is Searle’s concept of emergence loaded with a form of mechanicism, one which is being abandoned in more recent ontological conceptions., Searleovo pojetí ontologického vzestupu je základem pro jeho vysvětlení mysli a vědomí ve fyzickém světě. V tomto článku se snažím ukázat, že bližší zkoumání odhaluje některé možné nejasnosti v Searlově pojetí vzniku. Nejprve se snažím ukázat, že Searleův rozdíl mezi vznikajícím1 a vznikajícím2 vede k rozlišení mezi silným a slabým výkladem příčinných důsledků interakcí mezi konstitutivními entitami a že z tohoto hlediska je existence vznikajícího2 nepravděpodobná pouze v silných smyslu. Za druhé, snažím se objasnit Searleovo rozlišení mezi vysvětlení a dedukcívědomí v jeho tvrzení o neodvoditelnosti vědomí. V závěru se snažím ukázat, v jakém smyslu je Searleův koncept vzniku naplněn formou mechanismu, který je opuštěn v novějších ontologických koncepcích., and Vladimír Havlík
In the paper, I question some of the claims professor Searle makes about external realism, a position I accept. I briefly sum up Searle’s position, and then proceed to the mentioned critique. In particular, the target of my paper is Searle’s claim that external realist is to shun commitment to any particular ontology. I also point out that Searle’s external realism is in some respects difficult to disentangle from ontological constructivism, a position incompatible with external realism. The paper concludes with an apology for the idea of a ''Privileged Conceptual Scheme'' that Searle views as misguided., V příspěvku se ptám na některá tvrzení profesora Searleho o externím realismu, což je postoj, který přijímám. Stručně shrnuji Searlovu pozici a pak přistoupím k uvedené kritice. Hlavním cílem mé práce je Searlovo tvrzení, že externí realista je vyhýbat se závazkům vůči jakékoli ontologii. Poukazuji také na to, že Searleův externí realismus je v některých ohledech obtížně oddělitelný od ontologického konstruktivismu, což je pozice neslučitelná s vnějším realismem. Příspěvek je zakončen omluvou za myšlenku ,,privilegovaného konceptuálního schématu'', který Searle vnímá jako zavádějící., and Tomáš Marvan
The main aim of this paper is to survey and evaluate Searle’s account of metaphor (1979) in the light of Davidson’s arguments against the idea of metaphorical meaning, which appeared at roughly the same time. Since this paper is intended for a festschrift celebrating Searle’s respectable anniversary, I will mostly refrain from critical remarks and rather focus on the positive aspects of his account. I am going to show that Searle’s theory of metaphor is for the most part immune to Davidson’s arguments., Hlavním cílem této práce je zhodnotit a zhodnotit Searleův popis metafory (1979) ve světle Davidsonových argumentů proti myšlence metaforického významu, který se objevil zhruba ve stejnou dobu. Vzhledem k tomu, že tento dokument je určen pro slavnostní oslavu Searleho úctyhodného výročí, upustím od kritických poznámek a zaměřím se spíše na pozitivní aspekty jeho účtu. Ukážu, že Searleova teorie metafory je z velké části imunní vůči Davidsonovým argumentům., and Jakub Mácha
There is no unique idea regarding the form of the (Intentional) content part of visual experience in the specification. The philosophers’ approaches diverge as to whether the content of visual experience is equivalent to a sentence expressing proposition or not. Some of them (mainly philosophers from the phenomenological tradition) consider that one must use a proposition for the specification of the content only when the subject, while having a visual experience, exercise a concept or judge. For the other cases, which can be called simple seeing, a noun phrase is preferable. I argue that, holding that the specification of Intentional content of the visual experience should be in the form of a proposition, John Searle gives up the first-person Intentionality and therefore bypasses the first-person important distinction between simple seeing and judgmental seeing. The specification of the content only in the form of the proposition does not allow making such a distinction on the level of description. Then I argue that the feature of the causal self-referentiality of the visual experience belongs to its psychological mode but not, as Searle holds, to the Intentional content of the visual experience., Neexistuje žádná jedinečná myšlenka týkající se formy (záměrné) obsahové části vizuálního zážitku ve specifikaci. Přístupy filosofů se liší v tom, zda je obsah vizuálního zážitku rovnocenný s větou, která vyjadřuje nebo ne. Někteří z nich (především filosofové z fenomenologické tradice) se domnívají, že člověk musí použít výrok pro specifikaci obsahu pouze tehdy, když subjekt, který má vizuální zkušenost, vykonává koncept nebo soudce. Pro ostatní případy, které lze nazvat jednoduchým viděnímje preferována podstatná fráze. Tvrdím, že John Searle, který se domnívá, že specifikace Úmyslného obsahu vizuálního zážitku by měla být ve formě tvrzení, se vzdává Úmyslnosti první osoby, a proto obchází důležité rozlišení prvního člověka mezi prostým viděním a posuzováním. Specifikace obsahu pouze ve formě návrhu neumožňuje takové rozlišení na úrovni popisu. Pak tvrdím, že rys kauzálního sebepojetí vizuálního zážitku patří k jeho psychologickému režimu, ale ne, jak Searle drží, k Úmyslnému obsahu vizuálního zážitku., and Anar Jafarov