The paper is a contribution to the debate on the epistemological status of thought experiments. I deal with the epistemological uniqueness of experiments in the sense of their irreducibility to other sources of justification. In particular, I criticize an influential argument for the irreducibility of thought experiments to general arguments. First, I introduce the radical empiricist theory of eliminativism, which considers thought experiments to be rhetorically modified arguments, uninteresting from the epistemological point of view. Second, I present objections to the theory, focusing on the critique of eliminativism by Tamar Szabó Gendler based on the reconstruction of Galileo’s famous Pisa experiment. I show that her reconstruction is simplistic and that a more elaborate reconstruction is needed for an appropriate assess-ment of the epistemic power of general argument. I propose such a reconstruction and demonstrate that the general version of the Pisa experiment is epistemically equal to the particular one. Thus, from an epistemological perspective, Galileo’s thought experiment is reducible to a straightforward argument without particular premises., Příspěvek je příspěvkem do debaty o epistemologickém stavu experimentů myšlení. Zabývám se epistemologickou jedinečností experimentů ve smyslu jejich neredukovatelnosti na jiné zdroje ospravedlnění. Zvláště kritizuji vlivný argument pro ireducibilitu myšlenkových experimentů k obecným argumentům. Nejprve představuji radikální empirickou teorii eliminativismu, která považuje myšlenkové experimenty za rétoricky modifikované argumenty, nezajímavé z epistemologického hlediska. Za druhé, předkládám námitky proti teorii, zaměřené na kritiku eliminativismu Tamara Szabó Gendlera na základě rekonstrukce slavného experimentu v Pise v Galileu. Ukazuji, že její rekonstrukce je zjednodušující a že je zapotřebí propracovanější rekonstrukce pro vhodné posouzení epistemické moci obecného argumentu. Navrhuji takovou rekonstrukci a prokázat, že obecná verze experimentu v Pise je epistemicky rovnocenná té konkrétní. Z epistemologického hlediska je tedy Galileův myšlenkový experiment redukovatelný na jednoduchý argument bez konkrétních prostor., and Marek Picha
An application of different mulch materials may lead to changes in soil properties. Our previous study, focused on the impact of various mulches during the 4-year period, showed that the change in some properties can be very rapid (e.g., soil pH), but in other cases such as hydraulic properties, the changes can be gradual. To find out, whether the extension of the mulching period will further affect the studied soil properties, the experiment continued for another 2 years. Differences between values of organic carbon content (Cox), soil physical quality (Sinf), gravitational water (GW) and readily available water (RAW) of soils not covered by any mulch and under various mulches (bark chips; wood chips; wheat straw; Agrotex EKO+ decomposable matting; polypropylene fabric covered bark chips; crushed stone) were much larger than those observed in our previous study. On the other hand, the opposite trend was observed for the water stable aggregates (WSA) index or soil pH. Differences between additionally measured hydraulic conductivities at the pressure head of −2 cm and repellency index (RI) were mostly insignificant. Results indicated that organic mulches can either positively (e.g., increase WSA index and Cox, and decrease GW) or negatively (e.g., decrease Sinf and RAW, and increase RI) affect soil properties.
Limits of the Coalition Partnership between Agrarians and Social Democrats. To Social Programs of Agrarian and Social Democratic Party during the Interwar Period.
Upon presenting perceptual theories of emotions and their main weaknesses we concentrate on Prinz’s account that characterizes emotions as valent embodied appraisals. Granting his assumptions we propose a counterargument against his proposal, based on Darwin’s work on bodily expression of emotions. We show that it is possible for non-emotional mental states to be brought about by perceptions of bodily changes and that these perceptions satisfy both the conditions of valence and externally directed semantics that Prinz believes are unique to emotions. and Juraj Hvorecký