A comparison of Searle’s contrasting position on explaining consciousness and free will is conducted with an aim to show that while consciousness on his view presents a relatively easy problem, while free will is presented as a serious challenge to naturalism. We suggest that with a certain shift of perspective on causality, free will problem might be just as tractable as the problem of consciousness., Porovnání Searlovy kontrastní pozice s vysvětlením vědomí a svobodné vůle je prováděno s cílem ukázat, že zatímco vědomí na jeho pohled představuje relativně snadný problém, zatímco svobodná vůle je prezentována jako vážný problém pro naturalismus. Navrhujeme, že s určitým posunem pohledu na kauzalitu by mohl být problém svobodné vůle stejně praktický jako problém vědomí., and Juraj Hvorecký
Upon presenting perceptual theories of emotions and their main weaknesses we concentrate on Prinz’s account that characterizes emotions as valent embodied appraisals. Granting his assumptions we propose a counterargument against his proposal, based on Darwin’s work on bodily expression of emotions. We show that it is possible for non-emotional mental states to be brought about by perceptions of bodily changes and that these perceptions satisfy both the conditions of valence and externally directed semantics that Prinz believes are unique to emotions. and Juraj Hvorecký
In this article, the author presents the starting points for a discussion about cognitive phenomenality and, especially, the introspective arguments in its favor. These are based on the argument of abstracting away, in which we neglect its non-phenomenal parts from the selected cognitive state and the result of the operation is a pure phenomenal sense, associated with the cognitive state. The author describes the process of abstracting away with several examples. Immediately following other examples from the philosophy of emotions, he shows that in spite of its intuitive power, the method of abstracting away does not come with substantiated conclusions. This casts doubt on the strength of the introspective arguments that are raised in favor of cognitive phenomenology, especially in the context of a more general thesis about the unity of mind. Finally, the author comes to the conclusion that cognitive phenomenology needs other than introspective methods to defend itself. and V tejto stati autor predstavuje východiská diskusie o kognitívnej fenomenalite a najmä introspektívne argumenty v jej prospech. Tie sa opierajú o argument odmýšľania, keď od vybraného kognitívneho stavu abstrahujeme jeho nefenomenálne časti a výsledkom operácie je čistý fenomenálny pocit, spojený s kognitívnym stavom. Proces odmýšľania autor popisuje na niekoľkých príkladoch. Vzápätí na iných príkladoch z filozofie emócií ukazuje, že napriek jej intuitívnej sile neprichádza metóda odmýšľania so zdôvodnenými závermi. To spochybňuje silu introspektívnych argumentov vznášaných v prospech kognitívnej fenomenológie, najmä v súvislosti s všeobecnejšou tézou o jednote mysli. Napokon autor v tejto stati dospieva k záveru, že kognitívna fenomenológia potrebuje na svoju obhajobu iné než introspektívne metódy.