Tento článek usiluje o systematický popis teorie stylů myšlení a myšlenkových společenství polského mikrobiologa Ludwika Flecka. Článek se zabývá výchozím bodem jeho teorie: případovou studií tzv. Wassermanova testu. Následně je Fleckova teorie prezentována nejprve ve světle Struktury vědeckých revolucí Thomase Kuhna . Jsou zaznamenány některé podobnosti mezi oběma mysliteli (např. užívání konceptu nesouměřitelnosti, odkazy ke gestalt psychologii, předpoklad teoretické zatíženosti pozorování, pohled na vědeckou literaturu). Přesto se Fleckova stanoviska od Kuhnových v některých důležitých ohledech liší (např. názory na stabilizaci, ve Fleckově teorii nepřítomnost konceptu analogického k vědeckým revolucím). Na rozdíl od převládajícího názoru tyto rozdíly zamezují tomu, aby byl Fleck považován za předchůdce Kuhna. Z těchto důvodů tento článek zmiňuje také možnost prezentovat Fleckova stanoviska v jiném kontextu, jenž je pokládán za prospěšnější, a kterým je francouzská epistemologie (např. Canguilhem, Hacking)., The present paper aims at describing systematically the theory of thought-styles and thought-collectives of Polish microbiologist Ludwik Fleck. The paper describes its starting point: case study of the so-called Wasserman test. In what follows, Fleck’s theory is presented at first in the light of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by Thomas Kuhn. Some similarities between the two thinkers are pointed out (e. g. the use of incommensurability concept, the reference to gestalt psychology, the theory-ladenness of observation, the view on scientific literature). Yet Fleck’s views diff er from Kuhn’s in some important respects (e. g. the views on stabilisation, the absence of counterpart of scientific revolutions in Fleck’s theory). Contrary to the prevailing view, these differences preclude consideration of Fleck as a forerunner of Kuhn. For this reason, the present paper mentions also possibility of presentation of Fleck’s views in another context which is deemed more helpful: French epistemology (e. g. Canguilhem, Hacking)., and Jindřich Černý.
V diskusiách o hodnote a počiatku ľudského života sa aj v našich slovenských pomeroch objavujú, na rozličných úrovniach, rozmanité postoje, ktoré sú často ovplyvnené rozdielnymi filozofickými prúdmi a zmýšľaním. V posledných rokoch k tomu prispieva aj stupňujúci sa vplyv myslenia, vo Viedni narodeného Austrálčana, Petra Singera, pôsobiaci na viacerých slovenských filozofov. V tomto príspevku podávame niekoľko reakcií a názorov na anglosaskému mysleniu blízku Singerovu teóriu druhizmu (speciesizmu) a iné jeho názory z pohľadu filozofickej a teologickej etiky. Priblížime si hlavne názory autorov z nemecky hovoriaceho prostredia, ktorí sa vo svojich dielach venujú aj posúdeniu jeho teórie druhizmu. Nemecko totiž dodnes bojuje s následkami nacizmu, teda s nočnou morou 20. storočia, ktorá úzko súvisí práve s touto teóriou. Cieľom príspevku však nie je logicky vyvrátiť Singerovu teóriu, ale poukázať na jej nedostatky a zdôrazniť dôvody, prečo ju nie je možné z etického hľadiska akceptovať. V záverečnej časti sa pokúšame otočiť argumentovanie smerom k tým, ktorí preferujú výskum na ľudských embryách a na ľudských embryonálnych kmeňových bunkách. Práve títo odborníci by sa mali, podľa nás, podujať jasne dokázať, že v prípade ľudských embryí nejde o človeka (alebo osobu), a teda že v rámci výskumu môžu byť ľubovoľne použité, a teda i usmrtené., In our discussion about the value of human life various attitudes appear at different levels, influenced by diverse philosophical approaches. A notable role is played by the attitudes and theory of Peter Singer in influencing some Slovak philosophers. In this paper we advance several observations on Singer’s theory of speciesism, especially from the view of philosophical and theological ethics. We are above all concerned with authors from German-speaking areas, who have focused on speciesism in their theories. The aim of this paper is not to logically refute the theory, but rather to show its shortcomings and to offer reasons why it should not be accepted. In the concluding part we attempt to turn around the case in support of research into human embryos and human-embryo stem-cells. It is those who support such research, we argue, who should clearly demonstrate that a human embryo is not a person and that, in the cause of scientific enquiry, they can be used and killed., and Inocent‑Mária V. Szaniszló.
Autor podrobně rozebírá Masarykův válečný traktát Nová Evropa a užívá jejjako klíč k myšlení T. G. M. jako myslitele demokracie. Tímto humanitně-demokratickým prismatem, výrazně masarykovským, pak probírá vývoj českého povědomí od vzniku československého státu po počátek devadesátých let 20. století. Předkládá tak čtenáři velkolepý pohled na smysl českého bytí očima T.G.M., tedy „z hlediska věčnosti, protože [Masaryk] byl realista.“, The author reads in detail Masaryk’s war-time tract, New Europe, using it as a key to the thought of Masaryk as a philosopher of democracy. Through this humanistic-democratic prism, distinctly his own, he then reads the fortunes of Czech consciousness from the birth of the Czechoslovak state (1918) down to the nineties of the 20th century. He thus presents the reader with an imposing overview of the meaning of Czech being through the eyes of T. G. Masaryk, that is, “from the perspective of eternity, because he was a realist”., and Jaroslav Šabata.
Autor polemizuje s názorem, který nedávno vyjádřili Tomáš Machula a David Peroutka, že materialismus, převažující v současné filosofii mysli, by měl být nahrazen tomistickým hylemorfismem. Polemika se zaměřuje na dva aspekty Machulova a Peroutkova argumentu. Za prvé, na jejich předpoklad, že současná preference materialismu je výsledkem náhody (neznalosti faktu, že kromě materialismu a dualismu se nabízí i hylemorfismus). Tento předpoklad si ovšem neporadí s faktem, že dualismus byl kritizován již v 17. století, ale materialismus se prosadil až v polovině minulého století. Za druhé, autor souhlasí, že tomistický hylemorfismus lze aktualizovat, a to dokonce úspěšněji, než jak se to podařilo Machulovi s Peroutkou. Této aktualizaci je však třeba obětovat některé metafyzicky neúnosné představy – konkrétně představu duše jako nemateriální substance nezávislé na těle., The author disputes the view, expressed recently by Tomáš Machula a David Peroutka, that materialism, dominant in contemporary philosophy of mind, should be substituted by Thomist hylomorphism. The critique focuses on two aspects of Machula and Peroutka’s argument. Firstly, on their assumption that the contemporary preference for materialism is the result of chance (ignorance of the fact that in addition to materialism and dualism the position of hylomorphism is also available). This assumption fails to take into account the fact that dualism was already the subject of criticism in the 17th century, but materialism only became properly established in the mid-twentieth century. Secondly, the author argues that Thomist hylomorphism can be updated in a more fruitful way than that proposed by Machula and Peroutka. This updating requires us, however, to sacrifice certain metaphysically unsustainable ideas – in particular the idea that the soul is a non-material substance independent of the body., and Tomáš Hříbek.
This study aims to interpret Mencius' political thinking taking as the starting point his doctrine of human nature. Each individual is capable of the moral self-cultivation of his or her innately good human nature, but in this task the individual requires adequate conditions and education. Political power is able to ensure this (and it is, indeed, one of its main asks to do so), but it can also, on the contrary, contribute, in a fundamental way, to the decadence of the state and society. The result of inadequate and ineffective application of political power is a growing crisis in society, especially in the area of inter-personal relations and moral conduct. Mencius' ideal is a relatively small and effective state that looks after its inhabitants and which does not unduly intervene in the social organism. War is understood, by him, as a great evil which is justifiably used only when putting-down an uprising or in self-defence. Generally, Mencius' political thought is characterized by the thought that the virtuous ruler will have, by dint of his strength of character, not only spiritual but also purely practical political successes., Stanislav Myšička., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Merleau-Ponty holds that Husserl's descriptions of the body go beyond the conceptual framework of subject-object ontology to which his philosophy is usually thought to conform. Merleau-Ponty says of is own philosophy that it is founded on the circularity in the body; that is, on the fact that the perceptivity and perception of the body are, from the ontological point of view, one and the same. The inseparability of these two aspects of the body he calls flesh (chair). According to Husserl, I perceive my body such that in a certain perceived object I also understand sensations roused by the perception of that object - I observe the "consequential parallel" between two series of objective and subjective phenomena. Husserl argues that the unity of the body should be expressed as a double unity, and the body as a subject-object. In this article I analyse Husserl's example of two hands of the same body touching each other and, in agreement with Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, I attempt to show that the body can appear to itself as an object only on the basis of a differentiation of the body as of a certain field of perceiving. The body as a double unity of subject and object is therefore grounded in the body as a pre-objective and pre-subjective field; that is, in flesh as Merleau-Ponty understands it. This is also the point of departure for and original conception of ontology as we find it in his later philosophy., Jan Halák., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
The work is a contribution to the understanding of the structure and status of Hegel’s dialectic methods. In accordance with other commentators (Cramer, Düssing, Henrich, Horstmann), the author propounds the interpretation of Hegel’s logic as a theory of subjectivity sui generis. In a critical response to an article by H. F. Fulda, the author attempts to demonstrate that Hegel’s use of the term “pure determination of thought” (and similar terms) and their mentalistic interpretation do not imply a psychologisation of Hegel’s logic., Jindřich Karásek., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
This study takes the form of a response to Martin Ritter’s review article on my book From enowning. A phenomenological interpretation of Heidegger’s “Contributions to Philosophy” (Beiträge zur Philosophie). In its subject-matter it focuses on the key points of Ritter’s critique: on the theme of the phenomenological field and the related methodological priority of intentionality, on the status of the centre, and briefly also on the reduction of historicity in my interpretation of Heidegger. This study, when taken as a whole, is not meant as a dispute over a particular book, but as a discussion of the nature of phenomenology and of the scope of the phenomenological method to which Heidegger leads us in his Contributions to Philosophy (Beiträge zur Philosophie). The account concentrates on the theme of the methodological opening-up of the phenomenological field, and on the possibility of its topological interpretation. The opening-up of the phenomenological field is, at the same time, interpreted as the determining feature of phenomenological philosophy and the common element in Husserl’s and Heidegger’s use of the phenomenological method., Martin Nitsche., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii