The evolution of Marxist theory in the course of the 20th century was characterized, among other things, by the opening up of Marxism to other currents of thought. One such confluence occurred between Marxism and existentialism. Thanks to their humanistic interpretations of Marxism, Jean-Paul Sartre and Karel Kosík are usually seen as leading representatives of this interface. Both emphasize the social situation of man in their theoretical approaches, but at the same time also give consideration to the uniqueness of his experience and practical relation to the world. This study will try to show that, though Sartre and Kosík share a number of motifs in their work, they cannot be said to belong to the same line of thought. They might converge, that is to say, but they started from opposite directions. Kosík opens Marxism up to ideas from existentialism while solving them on the soil of practical materialism; Sartre, though accepting Marxist social theory, still holds to existentialist assumptions in which the individual is situated against the world and their social environment. and Vývoj marxistické teorie se v průběhu 20. století vyznačoval mimo jiné otevíráním marxismu vlivu dalších myšlenkových proudů. K jednomu z takových setkání došlo mezi marxismem a existencialismem. Jean-Paul Sartre a Karel Kosík jsou díky jejich humanistickému výkladu marxismu obvykle vnímáni jako přední představitelé této interakce. Oba vycházejí z důrazu na sociální situovanost člověka, současně ale ve svých teoriích dávají prostor také jedinečnosti jeho zkušenosti a praktického vztahování ke světu. Tato studie se pokusí dokázat, že navzdory řadě shodných motivů v jejich díle nemůžeme Jeana-Paula Sartra a Karla Kosíka zařazovat do téže myšlenkové linie. Oba autoři totiž vycházejí k onomu sblížení z opačných pólů. Zatímco Kosík otevírá marxismus podnětům z existencialismu, ale současně je stále řeší na půdě praktického materialismu, Sartre navzdory přijetí marxistické sociální teorie stále drží existencialistické předpoklady, v nichž je jedinec postaven proti světu a svému sociálnímu prostředí.
The paper presents a contrastive Czech–Spanish study concentrating on reportative markers. Methodologically, it is based on the cognitive theories of mental spaces and grounding, with the primary focus on the Spanish counterparts of the Czech prý, and the secondary focus on the Czech counterparts of the Spanish dizque. The analysis is conducted using the parallel corpus InterCorp and presents evidentiality as a complex category, which is closely related to tense and evaluative modality. The translation respondents of prý and dizque in both languages display significant variability. The corpus data reveal that notions attributed to them are expressed in a complex way in the other language, pointing out that grammatical and lexical elements such as sequence of tenses and diminutive suffixes can convey notions similar to those conveyed by adverbial hearsay markers or verba dicendi. and Článek se zaměřuje na kontrastivní česko-španělskou analýzu reportativních částic. Metodologicky vychází z kognitivních teorií mentálních prostorů a groundingu, přičemž pozornost je zaměřena primárně na španělské protějšky českého prý, ve druhém plánu také na české protějšky španělského dizque. Analýzy vycházejí z jazykového materiálu pocházejícího z korpusu InterCorp a prezentují evidencialitu jakožto komplexní kategorii, která je blízce spjatá s kategoriemi času a evaluativní modality. Překladatelské protějšky prý a dizque vykazují v obou jazycích velkou variabilitu, přičemž data z korpusu dokazují, že významy, které v sobě tyto částice zahrnují, jsou v druhém jazyce často vyjádřeny komplexním způsobem. Časová souslednost nebo deminutivní sufixy v některých kontextech vyjadřují podobné významové odstíny, jaké přisuzujeme adverbiálním částicím označujícím externí zdroj informace nebo slovesům mluvení.
The experience of pregnancy during which one human body lives inside another human body can provide an unconventional way of making some aspects of human subjectivity and embodiment stand out. This article arises from a phenomenological analysis of the living body and through a comparative analysis of two philosophical descriptions of pregnancy (N. Depraz a I. Young) it arrives at an alternative understanding of the duality which characterises this experience. Instead of the duality of self and the other in myself – of identity and inner alterity – it offers a topological duality of excessive closeness and distance from one’s own interpretation of reality. The article draws, in this, on the account of friendship in G. Agamben, well-being in G. Bachelard and the world outside the world of J. Derrida. In this way there is not constituted some kind of more powerful female subjectivity, but conduct on the basis of tact with respect to the hiddenness of reality. With reference to a question of J. Butler, the final part of the article deals with the possibilities of ethics in a subject that is not transparent to itself, something which flows from the experience just analysed.
In this text we aim to analyze the Cartesian motifs in the “early” period of Emmanuel Levinas’s thought. Our goal is to explore whether Levinas’s Cartesianism is merely a singular phenomenon, or if it can be set into the wider current of “phenomenologi-cal Cartesianism”. In order to confirm the second possibility, it seems that we must reconstruct the motifs, continuing in Descartes’s specific line of argumentation, which we can directly designate as the “Cartesian way”. These Cartesian motifs can be found in Levinas’s wider context of the issue of subjectivity, and it is these deliberations that form the structure in which the famous formulation of the definition of infinity is made. The first text in which we attempt to identify this general structure that Des-cartes provides for Levinas’s thought and the function that it fulfills in it is Description of Existence. The second motif is Cartesian subjectivity in the book Existence and Existents.
Text se pokouší sledovat, jakým způsobem se významný český marxista meziválečného období Jaroslav Kabeš snažil rozpracovávat subjektivní stránku marxistické filosofie ve formě specifické etiky. Tuto jeho koncepci autor stati nazval „etikou vůle k přetvoření světa“. Kabešovo úsilí je v textu rámováno „krizí“ marxismu po říjnové revoluci, která vyvolala debatu o dalším směřování marxistické filosofie. Jednou z radikálních odpovědí na tuto situaci byla rehabilitace jejího revolučního charakteru skrze znovuoživení prvků hegelovské dialektiky v Marxových spisech (K. Korsch, G. Lukács). Kabeš se naopak obrátil k tradici voluntaristické filosofie (A. Schopenhauer, F. Nietzsche), ale rovněž k nejranějším Marxovým spisům a Leninově korespondenci, aby zde našel podněty pro svůj projekt materialisticky chápaného etického postoje. and The text attempts to follow the path that Jaroslav Kabeš, a notable Czech Marxist of the interwar period, took to work out the subjective side of Marxist philosophy in the form of a specific ethics. The article’s author calls Kabeš’ conception an “ethics of the will to transform the world.” Kabeš’ efforts are framed in the article by the “crisis” in Marxism that followed the October Revolution and which triggered a debate on the direction that Marxist philosophy should take in the future. One of the radical responses to this situation was to rehabilitate its revolutionary character by reviving the elements of Hegel’s dialectic in Marx’s writings (K. Korsch, G. Lukács). Kabeš, by contrast, turned not only to the philosophical tradition of voluntarism (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche) but also to the earliest writings of Marx and to Lenin’s correspondence so as to find the stimuli for his project of a materialistically understood ethical position.
The work is a contribution to the understanding of the structure and status of Hegel’s dialectic methods. In accordance with other commentators (Cramer, Düssing, Henrich, Horstmann), the author propounds the interpretation of Hegel’s logic as a theory of subjectivity sui generis. In a critical response to an article by H. F. Fulda, the author attempts to demonstrate that Hegel’s use of the term “pure determination of thought” (and similar terms) and their mentalistic interpretation do not imply a psychologisation of Hegel’s logic., Jindřich Karásek., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
The article aims to compare the models of human subjectivity developed by Marek Siemek (in his post-Marxist period) and Evald Ilyenkov. Both authors define human subjectivity as a self-reflective relation between the “I” and the self. This self-referentiality is possible only in relation to the other, mediated through a non-subjective element. Subjectivity, therefore, is something essentially intersubjective for both philosophers. But even though these two perspectives share the same basic scheme, they are developed in very different ways. As I argue, the main difference between them can be seen in the conceptualisation of the third, objective element. Whereas Ilyenkov describes this element as a thing involved in human activity (for example, a tool) and therefore meaningful (a view strongly connected with his theory of the ideal), Siemek emphasises the role of the civil society and its institutions. Exploring this difference is especially important as it reflects an inherent political dimension in Ilyenkov’s and Siemek’s thought. I evaluate this political dimension, pointing to the originality of Siemek’s defence of capitalism and the Schillerian traces in both concepts.
The paper deals with the stories representing the suicide of Prague (German writing) authors, Christian Heinrich Spieß, Johann Friedrich Ernst Albrecht and Reactions to the Wertheriads, which document the divergent development of cutures of subjectivity (Reckwitz) in Central Europe in the age of Enlightenment. The first part of the paper reconstructs the influence of the radical preromantism and Sturm und Drang, namely The Sorrows of Young Werther in the Bohemian Lands. Next, It compares the Stories written by Spieß and Albrecht with Werther as a paradigmatic text and its model of Subjectivity. It focuses to the Story Die neue Sapfo written by Spieß in 1779, which documents the genesis of his later stories and the development of the conception of the role of the subject., Václav Smyčka., and Obsahuje bibliografické odkazy
This paper is a critical appraisal of the most recent attempt from cognitive science in general, developmental and evolutionary biology in particular, to understand the nature and mechanisms underlying consciousness as proposed by Anton J.M. Dijker. The proposal, briefly stated, is to view consciousness as a neural capacity for objec- tivity. What makes the problem of consciousness philosophically and scientifically challenging may be stated as follows: If consciousness has a first-person ontology and our best scientific theories have a third-person ontology, how can we come up with a satisfactory theory? Moreover, if the reduction of one to the other is impossible, what are we supposed to do? By neglecting what Chalmers calls the ''hard problem'' of consciousness, Dijker’s proposal seems unable to respond to the foregoing questions, and these questions, I maintain, are the very motivations that most of us have when we inquire about consciousness., Tento článek je kritickým posouzením posledního pokusu o kognitivní vědu obecně, zejména vývojové a evoluční biologie, pochopit podstatu a mechanismy, které jsou základem vědomí, jak navrhl Anton JM Dijker. Návrh, stručně řečeno, je vnímat vědomí jako neurální schopnost objektivity. Co dělá problém vědomí filozoficky a vědecky náročný, lze říci následovně: Pokud má vědomí první ontologii člověka a naše nejlepší vědecké teorie mají ontologii třetí osoby, jak můžeme přijít s uspokojivou teorií? Pokud je navíc redukce jednoho na druhého nemožná, co máme dělat? Zanedbáním toho, co Chalmers nazývá ,,tvrdým problémem'' vědomí, se zdá, že Dijkerův návrh nedokáže odpovědět na výše uvedené otázky, and John Ian K. Boongaling