The concept of "Exclusivism" is considered to represent one of the most characteristic features of International Nuclear Law. This concept is reflected by regulating matters of uses of nuclear energy and ionising radiation exclusively by distinct principles, that govern legal relations arising in these matters. The concept of "Exclusivism" has been widely reflected in the provisions of international conventions, which have been adopted since the 1960s. This article aims to revisit this concept, taking the most recent developments in international and European law into regard. The article is dealing with the reasons and origins of the concept of "Exclusivism" in International Nuclear Law, with reflections of this concept in existing international treaties and at last but not at least, with most recent tendencies, that aim at jeopardising this concept., Jakub Handrlica., and Obsahuje bibliografické odkazy
The paper presents a minimal extension of classical logic. The extension covers, mainly, (i) an introduction of legal regulations conceived as specific elements of provisions in legal rules; and (ii) an introduction of the application operation on legal regulations. Such an operation transforms a legal regulation into an empirical proposition describing some desired state of affairs. Moreover, it is assumed that legal arguments may contain two kinds of premises: a) legal regulations; and b) statements of empirical fact as a legal reality. A typical case of b) includes statements expressing the application or non-application of legal regulation in certain circumstances. Due to the distinctions introduced, the extended system of classical logic makes possible to analyse the logical structure of perfect norms as pentatomic. Although such a system is far remote from sophisticated systems of deontic logics, it is almost completely sufficient for lawyers’ practice., Článek prezentuje minimální rozšíření klasické logiky. Rozšíření se týká zejména (i) zavedení právních předpisů koncipovaných jako zvláštní prvky ustanovení právních předpisů; a (ii) zavedení provozu aplikaceo právních předpisech. Taková operace proměňuje právní úpravu v empirický návrh, který popisuje určitý požadovaný stav. Dále se předpokládá, že právní argumenty mohou obsahovat dva druhy prostor: a) právní předpisy; a b) vyjádření empirické skutečnosti jako právní skutečnosti. Typickým případem b) jsou prohlášení vyjadřující aplikaci nebo neuplatnění právní úpravy za určitých okolností. Díky zavedeným rozdílům umožňuje rozšířený systém klasické logiky analyzovat logickou strukturu dokonalých norem jako pentatomickou. Ačkoli takový systém je daleko od sofistikovaných systémů deontické logiky, pro praxi právníků je téměř zcela dostačující., and František Gahér
This paper examines the possibility and the desirability of axiomatization in law. In the first part, the paper examines the notion of axiom and the ways how it was or could be introduced into law. It is here where the authors openly invite the reader to lose the conventional approach and think about alternative ways to build basic legal concepts. In the second part, the paper continues by presenting several theories which endeavored (or appeared to endeavor) to show that law can (and should be) axiomatized and which even attempted to axiomatize it. After establishing whether these theories were successful at all, the authors add some of their own ideas on the topic of axiomatization., Martin Madej, Filip Horák., and Obsahuje bibliografické odkazy
The article deals with the principle of openness in the judiciary, specifically communicating judicial decisions to the public. Firstly, it discusses the relation between publicity and transparency of courts on the one hand and their legitimacy on the other. While the authors believe that the judiciary should be increasingly open to the public and point out benefits of that approach, they also recognize the risks thereof. Based on a comparative analysis of courts in a number of European states as well as the CJEU and ECHR the article analyses typical approaches to communication of judicial decisions. The final chapter contains normative conclusions which can serve as general guidelines applicable within the European judiciary., Daniel Askari, Kristina Blažková, Jan Chmel, Kristina Rademacherová., and Obsahuje bibliografické odkazy
In this paper the author provides a brief sketch of an interpretative turn in legal philosophy. In Law’s Empire, Ronald Dworkin advances a new theory of law, complex and intriguing. He calls it law as integrity. Dworkin’s conception of legal philosophy consists not in regarding its task as interpretive, for he advances the problem of what he dubbs the ''semantic sting''. The argument purports to establish the thesis that a theory of law cannot be an explanation of the meaning of the word ''law''. He claims that legal theories like H. L. A. Hart’s theory of law cannot explain the theoretical disagreement in legal practice, because they suffer from this semantic sting. The author agrees with Dworkin that Hart’s explanation of law is stung by semantics. It is his Dworkin’s main argument to deny that there is a possible alternative to his way of conceiving the task of legal philosophy. The author argues that the importance of Dworkin’s interpretative turn is not that it provides a substitute for ''semantic theories of law'', but that it provides a new conception of jurisprudence. and Marek Neština