This paper examines the possibility and the desirability of axiomatization in law. In the first part, the paper examines the notion of axiom and the ways how it was or could be introduced into law. It is here where the authors openly invite the reader to lose the conventional approach and think about alternative ways to build basic legal concepts. In the second part, the paper continues by presenting several theories which endeavored (or appeared to endeavor) to show that law can (and should be) axiomatized and which even attempted to axiomatize it. After establishing whether these theories were successful at all, the authors add some of their own ideas on the topic of axiomatization., Martin Madej, Filip Horák., and Obsahuje bibliografické odkazy
I consider and reject a specific criticism advanced by Korsgaard against virtue ethics and epistemology when these are conceived with the help of what she calls the image of the “Good Dog.” I consider what virtue ethics and epistemology would look like if the Good Dog picture of virtues were largely correct. I argue that attention to the features that make Korsgaard undermine the usefulness of virtues when conceived along the lines of the Good Dog picture reveals the opposite of what she claims. On the Good Dog picture, virtue ethics and epistemology are seen as more promising approaches to rationality than Korsgaard’s own advocacy of reflection.
Cieľom tohto textu je dokázať nasledujúce tri tézy: 1. Pýtať sa na umiestnenie právnej normy v rozlíšení „Existuje právna norma vo formálnom prameni práva alebo v ľudskej mysli?“ je zmätočné, ak nevymedzíme právno-filozofický problém, ktorý sa môže danou otázkou riešiť. 2.Nie je neplodné, ani nesprávne vnímať (právnu) normu (aj) ako vieru, presvedčenie, či motív ľudského správania. 3. Ak aj na úrovni ontológie noriem prijmeme, že norma ako fakt „existuje v ľudskej mysli“, potom to neznamená, že právnici strácajú dôvod hľadať právne normy v oficiálnych prameňoch práva – právna prax „beží“ ako doposiaľ. Tento text je koncipovaný ako polemická reakcia na článok Kde je právo?, v ktorom Dr. Eduard Bárány prezentoval názor, v zmysle ktorého uvedený ontologický prístup k normám oslabuje právo ako prostriedok sociálnej kontroly. and The aim of this paper is to back up three following theses: 1.To search for a location of legal norm in the context of distinction “Does legal norm exist in a formal source of law or rather in a human mind?” is confusing unless we delimitate a legal-philosophical puzzle which can be solved by answering such a question. 2. It is neither vain, nor wrong to conceive (legal) norm (also) as a belief or motive of human behaviour. 3. If we accepted at the level of ontology of norms that norm is a fact that “exists in a human mind” then it would not mean that lawyers lose the reason to look for legal norms in official sources of law – legal practice would “go on” as usual. This paper is conceived as a polemical reaction to the article Where is the law? in which Dr. Eduard Bárány argues that the aforementioned ontological approach towards norms weakens law as a means of social control.
Předložený článek si na základě rozboru hlavních motivů ve Foucaultově a Canguilhemově pojetí norem klade za cíl vymezit, jaká je vzájemná vazba mezi biologickou a společenskou normativitou a jakým typem moci na nás normy vlastně působí. V souladu s interpretací navrženou Pierrem Macherey se pokusíme sílu norem vystihnout v termínech jejich „imanence a produktivity" a ukázat, proč nelze normy chápat dle modelu zákona, který by ke svému předmětu přistupoval zvnějšku. Poslední část pak přináší odpověď na otázku, jaký typ individualizace či subjektivizace toto pojetí diskvalifikuje a jaké možnosti ponechává pro svébytnou singularitu v rámci normativního pole., The present paper is based on the analysis of Georges Canguilhem's and Michel Foucault's conception of norms and seeks to define the reciprocal relation between biological and social normativity. Both Canguilhem and Foucault are challenging our usual ideas about the manner in which the norms are exercising their power upon us. Following the interpretation proposed by Pierre Macherey, the paper tries to define the power of norms in terms of their "immanence and productivity". Such a conception prevents us from understanding the norm according to the model of Law, which is imposed on its subjects from outside. The final part of the paper seeks to determine, which kind of individualization or subjectivation this new concept of norms disqualifies and which possibilities does it leave open for autonomous singularity within the normative field., and Ondřej Švec.
In the paper, I discuss Robert Kirk’s attempt to refute the zombie argument against materialism by demonstrating, “in a way that is intuitively appealing as well as cogent”, that the idea of phenomenal zombies involves incoherence. Kirk’s argues that if one admits that a world of zombies z is conceivable, one should also admit the conceivability of a certain transformation from such a world to a world z* that satisfies a description D, and it is arguable that D is incoherent. From which, Kirk suggests, it follows that the idea of zombies is incoherent. I argue that Kirk’s argument has several minor deficiencies and two major flaws. First, he takes for granted that cognitive mental states are physical (cognitive physicalism), although a zombist is free to—and would better—reject this view. Second, he confuses elements of different scenarios of transformation, none of which results in the incoherent description D.