The paper sketches and defends two instances of the strategy Let N’s be whatever they have to be to explain our knowledge of them—one in which N’s are natural numbers and one in which N’s are propositions. The former, which makes heavy use of Hume’s principle and plural quantification, grounds our initial knowledge of number in (a) our identification of objects as falling under various types, (b) our ability to count (i.e. to pair memorized numerals with individuated objects of one’s attention), (c) our (initially perceptual) recognition of plural properties (e.g. being three in number), and (d) our predication of those properties of pluralities that possess them (even though no individuals in the pluralities do). Given this foundation, one can use Fregean techniques to non-paradoxically generate more extensive arithmetical knowledge. The second instance of my metaphysics-in-the-service-of-epistemology identifies propositions (i.e. semantic contents of some sentences, objects of the attitudes, and bearers of truth, falsity, necessity, contingency, and apriority) with certain kinds of purely representational cognitive acts, operations, or states. In addition to providing natural solutions to traditionally un-addressed epistemic problems involving linguistic cognition and language use, I argue that this metaphysical conception of propositions expands the solution spaces of many of the most recalcitrant and long-standing problems in natural-language semantics and the philosophy of language.
The author traces the road Dewey covered when he tried to free himself from a traditional ontology and epistemology. He did completely change understanding of the concept of experience. In the second part, author shows what it is meant to be ''true''/''false'' in the pragmatist logic and epistemology. It is indicated by explication of Dewey’s up-to-date conception of perception and knowledge. The role of action is stressed there. In the third part, author explains why our traditional approach to thinking could not accept this pragmatist understanding. He introduces there Dewey’s analysis of the old Greek idea of knowledge as seeing finalities of the ''true world''. In the semi-final part, the author articulates Dewey’s conception of ''ecological paradigm'' that could be seen as final liberation from the old, powerful, yet false tradition of the separate objects ontology. There the conception of situational ontology is presented. In the last part, he summarizes a new understanding of knowledge, truth and situational ontology and thus determines a new meaning of experience. Experience there is understood as a not-subjective field of powers that cross back and forth borders of objects in a process of achieving equilibrium., Autor sleduje cestu, kterou Dewey zakryl, když se snažil osvobodit od tradiční ontologie a epistemologie. Úplně změnil chápání pojmu zkušenosti. Ve druhé části autor ukazuje, co má být v pragmatické logice a epistemologii ,,pravdivé'' / ,,falešné''. To je naznačeno vysvětlením Deweyho aktuálního pojetí vnímání a poznání. Je zde zdůrazňována úloha akce. Ve třetí části autor vysvětluje, proč náš tradiční přístup k myšlení nemohl přijmout toto pragmatické chápání. Uvádí zde Deweyho analýzu staré řecké představy o poznání jako vidění finality „pravého světa“. V polovině závěrečné části autor vyjadřuje Deweyho pojetí ,,ekologického paradigmatu'', které lze považovat za konečné osvobození od starého, mocného, ale falešná tradice jednotlivých objektů ontologie. Zde je představena koncepce situační ontologie. V poslední části shrnuje nové chápání znalostí, pravdy a situační ontologie, a tak určuje nový význam zkušenosti. Zkušenost je chápána jako subjektivní pole moci, které překračuje hranice objektů v procesu dosažení rovnováhy., and Radim Šíp