The paper sketches and defends two instances of the strategy Let N’s be whatever they have to be to explain our knowledge of them—one in which N’s are natural numbers and one in which N’s are propositions. The former, which makes heavy use of Hume’s principle and plural quantification, grounds our initial knowledge of number in (a) our identification of objects as falling under various types, (b) our ability to count (i.e. to pair memorized numerals with individuated objects of one’s attention), (c) our (initially perceptual) recognition of plural properties (e.g. being three in number), and (d) our predication of those properties of pluralities that possess them (even though no individuals in the pluralities do). Given this foundation, one can use Fregean techniques to non-paradoxically generate more extensive arithmetical knowledge. The second instance of my metaphysics-in-the-service-of-epistemology identifies propositions (i.e. semantic contents of some sentences, objects of the attitudes, and bearers of truth, falsity, necessity, contingency, and apriority) with certain kinds of purely representational cognitive acts, operations, or states. In addition to providing natural solutions to traditionally un-addressed epistemic problems involving linguistic cognition and language use, I argue that this metaphysical conception of propositions expands the solution spaces of many of the most recalcitrant and long-standing problems in natural-language semantics and the philosophy of language.
This paper argues for the following three theses: (1) There is a clear reason to prefer physical theories with deterministic dynamical equations: such theories are maximally rich in information and usually also maximally simple. (2) There is a clear way how to introduce probabilities in a deterministic physical theory, namely as answer to the question of what evolution of a specific system we can reasonably expect under ignorance of its exact initial conditions. This procedure works in the same manner for both classical and quantum physics. (3) There is no cogent reason to take the parameters that enter into the (deterministic) dynamical equations of physics to refer to properties of the physical systems. Granting an ontological status to parameters such as mass, charge, wave functions and the like does not lead to a gain in explanation, but only to artificial problems. Against this background, I argue that there is no conflict between determinism in physics and free will (on whatever conception of free will), and, in general, point out the limits of science when it comes to the central metaphysical issues., Tato práce se zabývá následujícími třemi tezemi: (1) Existuje jasný důvod preferovat fyzikální teorie s deterministickými dynamickými rovnicemi: takové teorie jsou maximálně bohaté na informace a obvykle také maximálně jednoduché. (2) Existuje jasná cesta, jak zavést pravděpodobnosti do deterministické fyzikální teorie, a to jako odpověď na otázku, jaký vývoj určitého systému můžeme rozumně očekávat za nevědomosti jeho přesných počátečních podmínek. Tento postup funguje stejně pro klasickou i kvantovou fyziku. (3) Neexistuje žádný přesvědčivý důvod vzít v úvahu parametry, které vstupují do (deterministických) dynamických rovnic fyziky, aby odkazovaly na vlastnosti fyzikálních systémů. Udělení ontologického stavu parametrům, jako je hmotnost, náboj, vlnové funkce a podobně, nevede k zisku ve vysvětlení, ale pouze na umělé problémy. Na tomto pozadí tvrdím, že neexistuje žádný konflikt mezi determinismem ve fyzice a svobodnou vůlí (na jakékoli koncepci svobodné vůle) a obecně poukazuje na hranice vědy, pokud jde o ústřední metafyzické otázky., and Michael Esfeld
During the last decades several studies in cognitive psychology have shown that many of our actions do not depend on the reasons that we adduce afterwards, when we have to account for them. Our decisions seem to be often influenced by normatively or explanatorily irrelevant features of the environment of which we are not aware, and the reasons we offer for those decisions are a posteriori rationalisations. But exactly what reasons has the psychological research uncovered? In philosophy, a distinction has been commonly made between normative and motivating reasons: normative reasons make an action right, whereas motivating reasons explain our behaviour. Recently, Maria Alvarez has argued that, apart from normative (or justifying) reasons, we should further distinguish between motivating and explanatory reasons. We have, then, three kinds of reasons, and it is not clear which of them have been revealed as the real reasons for our actions by the psychological research. The answer we give to this question will have important implications both for the validity of our classifications of reasons and for our understanding of human action.