Text vykládá jednotlivé pojmy, které v Aristotelově díle představují kandidáty na protějšek moderního pojmu zdravého rozumu, a uvádí je do vzájemné souvislosti. Především v logických a rétorických textech Aristotelés pracuje s termínem endoxos, který používá pro výroky a osoby, které jsou v daném společenství uznávány. V epistemologii pracuje s termínem koiné aisthésis v souvislosti s vnímáním jako takovým. Autor poukazuje na vazbu, kterou u Aristotela díky jeho práci ve fyziologii má obecná schopnost vnímat třetí klíčový pojem, který patří do etiky, totiž na fronésis. V rámci výkladu fronésis má místo také poslední bezprostředně relevantní pojem – orthos logos. Aristotelova koncepce jednání, jež Aristotelés vykládá někdy pomocí tzv. praktického sylogismu, pak ukazuje na roli uznávaných výroků jako typických obecných premis v těchto sylogismech a roli osob uznávaných pro svou fronésis jako měřítek určujících kritéria pro to, co je dobré jednání., The text interprets the particular concepts in Aristotle’s work which present themselves as candidates for being the counterpart to the modern concept of common sense, and it introduces them in their mutual relatedness. Aristotle works with the term endoxos, particularly in his logical and rhetorical texts, which he uses for statements and persons which are recognised in a given community. In epistemology he works with the term koiné aisthésis in connection with perception as such. The author points to a third concept, which Aristotle, thanks to his work in physiology, has a general ability to perceive, and which belongs to ethics: this is fronésis In an interpretation of fronésis there is also a place for the last directly relevant concept – orthos logos. Aristotle’s conception of conduct, which he sometimes interprets with the help of a so-called practical syllogism, displays the role of recognised statements as the typical general premisses in these syllogisms, and the role of persons recognised for their fronésis as the measure of the determining criteria for what is good conduct., and Petr Glombíček.
The article examines the meaning of the other for Kant's idea of autonomy. Autonomy is interpreted, in relation to the universal demand of the ethical, as governing the will by principles. Autonomy as principled self-determination by means of the practical law cannot be understood as the standpoint of an isolated subject. Instead we must understand it as a standpoint taken towards others, which we treat as the aspect of spontaneity, and at the same time as a standpoint taken thanks to others, since others make possible its awakening and development - here the aspect of receptivity is discussed. In this two-way relation between autonomy (enabled by a self-determining goverment by principle) and the other, the character of dialogical mutuality is exhibited: autonomy is the principled considerateness of a good will towards others, and, in order for it to be such, it must be initiated by others., Ondřej Sikora., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
The well-known book by Peter Singer The Liberation of Animals has not only inspired a series of texts defending the rights and interests of animals, but has also provoked a discussion about what humanity is, what meaning can our belonging to the human kind have for us, and whether Singer’ critique of the “human prejudice” is justified. The paper considers two important defenders of “human prejudice”, B. A. O. Williams and C. Diamond, who both claim the concept of human being to be a basic ethical concept. In the first part, we will present Williams’s argument that solidarity and identity with one’s species doesn’t have the structure of a blameworthy privilege similar to sexism and racism. In the second part, we will proceed to Diamond’s conception of human being that is founded in relations and responses towards the other. Just as our treatment of a human being depends on whether we see this person as our fellow, so our treatment of an animal depends on how we see it. In the last part, we will consider Diamond’s illustration of how it is possible to change our perception of an animal and thus to change our treatment of it., Kamila Pacovská., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
This article aims to reconstruct Taylor’s concept of strong evaluation as a model of practical rationality. The concept of strong evaluation offers an attractive alternative to proceduralism, whether of a utilitarian or Kantian type, because it enables specific moral claims to be legitimised in the life of a person, and their justification does not abstract from the motivation of the person who lives in harmony with these standards. The sense of the concept of strong evaluation consists in its ability to highlight the all-transcending nature of values and evaluation in the real life. We will seek a response to the question of whether Taylor’s interpretation of the concept of strong evaluation is sufficiently broad as to cover the three relevant components of ethics: the question of values, moral norms and moral evaluation. With respect to this question we will also give an overview of Laitinen’s reinterpretation of this concept which, on the view of the author, illuminates the inner relations between the subject and morality and, by a treatment of the nature of moral norms in concepts or reasons for actions (as distinguished from the Kantian grounding of morality), points to the complementary nature of values and moral norms., Zuzana Palovičová., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Sam Harris ve své knize The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values (2010) tvrdí, že otázka morálních hodnot není ničím jiným než otázkou po blahu vědomých bytostí. Ve svém výkladu si Harris klade tři úkoly: etablovat etiku jakožto plně racionální a ideálně vědeckou disciplínu, posílit a obhájit naturalismus a ustanovit smysluplnost lidského života na nenáboženské bázi. Harrisova kniha se setkala s odmítnutím v odborných recenzích, avšak ne všechny kritiky jsou oprávněné a skutečný problém s Harrisovým přístupem podle mne leží jinde, než se kritici domnívají. Existují nejméně tři důvody, proč odmítnout Harrisovu koncepci morálky jakožto vědy. Prvním je konfuzní pojetí vědy, se kterým souvisí absence čehokoli vědeckého v Harrisově popisu etických problémů či jejich řešení. Druhý důvod je nekoherentní postup při výkladu původu hodnot. A konečně posledním důvodem k odmítnutí Harrisovy vize je podoba života, kterou nám nabízí jakožto výsledek přijetí etiky založené na vědě., Sam Harris in his book The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values (2010) argues that the question of moral values is none other than the question of the happiness of conscious beings. In his account Harris sets himself three tasks: to establish ethics as a fully rational and purely scientific discipline, to reinforce and defend naturalism, and to rest the meaning of human life on a non-religious grounding. Harris’ book has met with a negative reaction in journal reviews, but not all the criticisms are justified and the real problem with Harris’ approach, in my view, is different to what his critics suppose. There are at least three reasons why we should reject Harris’ conception of morality as a science. The first is his confused conception of science which brings with it the absence of any scientific (on Harris’ understanding) ethical problems and of their solution. The second reason is an incoherent approach in his account of the origin of values. And finally, the last reason for rejecting Harris’ vision is the form of life which he offers us as the result of accepting ethics founded on science., Jakub Jirsa., and Obsahuje seznam literatury
The concept of personal identity has recently come to play an increasingly important role in bioethical discussion concerning the beginning and end of human life. This study does not aim to represent the whole range of applications of theories of personal identity to bioethics. It focuses only on the beginning of human life, namely on the question of the moral acceptability of abortion. The author begins by describing an argument rejecting the acceptability of abortions which has been advanced by P. Lee, and it is shown that the validity of this argument depends on a certain conception of personal identity. Then the author briefly defines the psychological approach to personal identity, and he points to its weaknesses. There follows a discussion of the theory of animalism which claims that our persistence in time does not comprise any psychological factors. The conclusion of the article deals with various theories of moral status and indicates the inadequacy of functional criteria in accounting for the moral point of view. The article finishes by stating that the moral status of human beings should be founded on the concept of human dignity. If the considerations in the study have been set out correctly then they justify the following conclusion: abortions are morally unacceptable., David Černý., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Autor stručně představuje české veřejnosti málo známou maďarskou filosofku Ágnes Hellerovou. Po načrtnutí jejího filosoficko-politického vývoje (i jako významné představitelky středoevropské kritické teorie společnosti) zasazuje problematiku morálních konfliktů do širších souvislostí, v nichž autorka promýšlí svou eticko-morální koncepci a její předpoklady v teorii spravedlnosti. Zdůrazňuje význam plurality v etické oblasti, vyplývající z toho, že v posttradičních společnostech není možno vycházet z nějaké substanciální koncepce dobra a s ní souvisejících představ daného souboru mravů ve smyslu hegelovské „Sittlichkeit“. Morální a hodnotové orientace lidí musí být v těchto společnostech vždy znovu testovány a prověřovány, neboť člověk realizuje svou představu „dobrého“, resp. řádného života rozmanitým způsobem. Pluralizace se dotýká i oblasti ctností a jejich vztahu k hodnotám; autor oceňuje zvláště analýzy sociálních ctností v podmínkách nesvobody individua, kde se podle Hellerové běžné ctnosti stávají „vojenskými“, neboť jsou ohroženy základní hodnoty svobody a života. Pluralita etického univerza se promítá do oblasti morálních konfliktů, kde se jedná povýtce o „silné“ konflikty mezi různými pozitivními možnostmi mravního jednání. Autor oceňuje minuciózní analýzy, jejichž prostřednictvím Hellerová prezentuje různé způsoby užití rozumu v těchto konfliktech, především roli soudnosti („fronésis“). Za přínosnou považuje i interpretaci ambivalentní pozice konsekvencialismu a utilitarismu v mravním rozhodování. Zároveň se kriticky vyslovuje k interpretaci instrumentálně-finálního modelu, k níž Hellerorvá dospívá při rozboru Kantovy aplikace kategorického imperativu. Tuto interpretaci autor považuje za „pointilistickou“. Á. Hellerovou autor oceňuje jako významnou kritickou stoupenkyni humanistického projektu osvícenství., The author briefly introduces to the Czech public the little known Hungarian philosopher Ágnes Heller. After sketching her philosophical and political development (including her role as a significant figure in central European critical social theory), the author puts the question of moral conflicts into the wider contexts in which Heller developed her ethico-moral conception and her assumptions in a theory of justice. She emphasises the meaning of plurality in the ethical sphere, stemming from the fact that in post-traditional societies one cannot be guided by a substantial conception of good, nor by the connected ideas of a given collection of morals in the sense of Hegelian “Sittlichkeit”. The moral and evaluative orientation of people here must be always examined anew and checked, since man realises his idea of the good, or rather a life of integrity, in many different ways. This pluralisation also affects the area of virtues and their relation to values; the author especially appreciates Heller’s analyses of the social virtues under the conditions of non-freedom of the individual where normal virtues become “military”, as the basic values of freedom and life are threatened. The plurality of the ethical universe is transmitted into the area of moral conflicts where, for the most part, concern is with “powerful” conflicts between various positive possibilities of moral conduct. The author appreciates Heller’s minute analyses of the various ways of using reason in these conflicts, the role of judgement (phronésis) above all. He also treats as important the interpretation of the ambivalent position of consequentialism and utilitarianism in moral decision-making. At the same time a critical attitude is expressed towards Heller’s interpretation of the instrumentalist-teleological model in analysing Kant’s application of the categorical imperative, which is treated as “pointillistic”. The author looks upon Heller as a significant, critical representative of the humanistic project of the enlightenment., and Vlastimil Hála.
Much of the recent debate over the moral permissibility of abortion focuses on the question of whether the foetus is or is not a person, i.e. the only entity endowed with moral rights including the right to life. The article traces this line of thought in several key figures in the debate (Thomson, Tooley, Warren and Brody). However, I consider this way of argumentation as both inappropriate and misleading; in the second half of the article I offer arguments against using the concept of person in this debate., Jakub Jirsa., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
The author defends the idea of the ontological founding of environmental ethics. He recognises the need for a new morality that can foreshadow the biophile transformation of culture, but at the same time he knows that this morality may actually develop during the course of the transformation itself. He presents the view that the relation of man to nature is mediated not only by the relevant culture, but also by its hidden spiritual grounding, which determines the character of culture, both spiritual and material. Today’s culture finds itself in crisis because its predatory spiritual grounding is leading it to its own ruin. A biophile change in this grounding is therefore the condition for the emergence of a more sustained biophile culture. However, even if we recognise the ontological grounding of ethics, this does not necessarily mean that we fully understand the superior subjectivity of nature, nor that we recognise the higher moral principle in the relation of culture to the Earth. The Author therefore, albeit schematically, presents his evolutionarily-ontological concept of man, nature and culture., Josef Šmajs., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii