Článek se pokouší v Lévinasově rané filosofii odhalit náznaky, v pozdní tvorbě již plně rozvinuté, etické koncepce bytí-pro-druhého. První texty, jež jsou stále do značné míry formované Heideggerovou fundamentální ontologií, staví do popředí fenomén neosobního bytí – ono je [il y a]. Ukážeme, že mimo čistě ontologický záběr můžeme v Lévinasově postulaci pojmu identifikovat intence jednak existenciální, jednak etické. Nálada hrůzy, vyvěrající ze zkušenosti subjektu s il y a, totiž vrhá individuální vědomí v existenciální otřes, jenž zpřístupňuje možnost etického obratu. Toto existenciálně-etické prizma v první řadě utváří ucelený narativ, spojující Lévinasovy rané ontologické úvahy s etickou koncepcí rozvinutou v pozdní tvorbě, zadruhé pak poukazuje na význačnou formativní funkci nálad v existenciální fenomenologii. Především nálada hrůzy se ukazuje jako způsob, jak negativně fundovat i motivovat etické smýšlení., The article attempts to discover, in Levinas’ early philosophy, the first indications of what by his later writings would become a fully developed, ethical conception of being-for-the other. The first texts, which were in large measure shaped by Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, place the phenomenon of impersonal being – il y a (there is) – into the forefront. We show that, besides a purely ontological view, we can in Levinas’ postulation of the concept identify intentions that are both existential and ethical. The mood of horror, resulting from the subject’s experience with il y a, throws individual consciousness into an existential upheaval, opening up the possibility for an ethical turn. This existential-ethical prism forms, first of all, a comprehensive narrative, combining Levinas’ early ontological thinking with the ethical concept that he developed in his late work and, secondly, points to a significant formative function of moods in existential phenomenology. Above all, the mood of horror is showing itself to be a way to negatively serve and motivate ethical attitudes., and Notre étude essaye découvrir des signes du concept éthique de l’être pour autrui contenus déjà dans la première philosophie de Lévinas mais pleinement développés ultérieurement. Les textes premiers, influencés considérablement par l’ontologie fondamentale de Heidegger, mettent en avance le phénomène de l’être impersonnel – il y a. Nous allons montrer qu’en dehors de prise proprement ontologique dans la formulation première de ce concept par Lévinas on peut y identifier les intentions à la fois existentielles et éthiques. L’ambiance de l’horreur provenant de l’expérience du sujet avec il y a ébranle existentiellement la conscience individuelle en l’ouvrant à la Kehre éthique. Ce regard éthico-existentiel formule en premier lieu un récit complet liant les premières réflexions ontologiques de Lévinas à un concept éthique développé dans son travail ultérieur, il attire attention ensuite à l’importante fonction formative des ambiances dans la phénoménologie existentielle. C’est en effet surtout l’ambiance de l’horreur qui se révèle en tant que moyen permettant une fondation et motivation négatives de la réflexion éthique.
Depression is a complex disorder related to chronic inflammatory processes, chronic stress changes and a hippocampal response. There is a increasing knowledge about the role of glial cells in nutrient supply to neurons, maintenance of synaptic contacts and tissue homeostasis within the CNS. Glial cells, viewed in the past as passive elements with a limited influence on neuronal function, are becoming recognized as active partners of neurons and are starting to be discussed as a possible therapeutic target. Their role in the pathogenesis of depressive disorders is also being reconsidered. Attention is devoted to studies of the different types of antidepressants and their effects on transmembrane signaling, including levels of α subunits of G proteins in C6 glioma cells in vitro as a model of postsynaptic changes in vivo. These models indicate similarities in antidepressant effects on G proteins of brain cells and effector cells of natural immunity, natural killers and granulocytes. Thus, an antidepressant response can exhibit certain common characteristics in functionally different systems which also participate in disease pathogenesis. There are, however, differences in the astrocyte G-protein responses to antidepressant treatment, indicating that antidepressants differ in their effect on glial signalization. Today mainstream approach to neurobiological basis of depressive disorders and other mood illnesses is linked to abnormalities in transmembrane signal transduction via G-protein coupled receptors. Intracellular signalization cascade modulation results in the activation of transcription factors with subsequent increased production of a wide array of products including growth factors and to changes in cellular activity and reactivity., M. Páv, H. Kovářů, A. Fišerová, E. Havrdová, V. Lisá., and Obsahuje bibliografii a bibliografické odkazy
The paper reflects a long-term ambiguity in the theoretical concept of affective phenomena. The focal point of this study is the conceptualization of the term “affect” with regard to the other affective phenomena (specifically emotion and mood). Our definition of affect is substantially different than existing Czech terminology and we define affect as the necessary component of all affective processes. Contrary to the Czech traditional concept of affect, we do not attribute characteristics such as “high intensity” or “disorganising influence” on cognitive processes, behaviour, etc. per se. We define affect in accordance with many authors, as a point in the continuum of affective stream and the basic unit of all affective phenomena. Affective phenomena or processes we consider as an umbrella term for a complex phenomenon like affect, emotion, mood, emotional episode, interpersonal attitude, sentiment, passion and so on: their common component is the affect. We consider emotion as a figure that emerges in the affective stream as a complex reaction to the event that has meaning for an individual and is interpreted with respect to the experience, context, individual characteristic, and sociocultural environment of the individual. Contrary to the Czech tradition, emotions are viewed as “just” one type of affective phenomena with a relatively specific definitional framework. The moods are considered parts of the affective stream continuum that have a specific and for consciousness accessible quality. The concepts of affect, emotion and mood discussed in this paper are contrasted; however, we have described where they overlap conceptually. The relationships of all affective phenomena have been considered as interacting with a tendency to synchronize into one (for an individual typical) affective stream., I. Poláčková Šolcová, R. Trnka., and Obsahuje seznam literatury