A misclassified size-biased modified power series distribution (MSBMPSD) where some of the observations corresponding to x = 2 are misclassified as x = 1 with probability α, is defined. We obtain its recurrence relations among ordinary, central and factorial moments and also for some of its particular cases like the size-biased generalized negative binomial (SBGNB) and the size-biased generalized Poisson (SBGP) distributions. We also discuss the effect of the misclassification on the variance for MSBMPSD and illustrate an example for size-biased generalized negative binomial distribution. Finally, an example is presented for the size-biased generalized Poisson distribution to illustrate the results, and a goodness of fit test is also done using the method of moments.
Myocardial blood flow is spatially heterogeneous, reflecting non-uniform oxygen supply. Also, myocardial oxida-tive metabolism is spatially heterogeneous. The effects of acute ischemia and reperfusion on the rela-tionship between local myocardial blood flow (LMF) and oxi-dative metabolism are still unknown. LMF was measured in isolated, blood-perfused rabbit hearts using colored microspheres and oxidation water labeled with 18O2 (H218O). Three protocols were performed: 18O2-perfusion during normoxia (N; n=7), during early reperfusion (ER; 10 min, n=6), and late reperfusion (LR; 40 min, n=6) following 20 min no-flow ischemia. LMF and local H218O residues were determined within defined myocardial samples (105 ± 15 mg). For interindividual comparison, values were normalized to the mean of the individual experiment and expressed as percentages. LMF ranged from 18 to 193 % (N), 12 to 250 % (ER), and 11 to 180 % (LR). The H218O tissue residue ranged from 63 to 132 % (N), 73 to 142 % (ER) and 32 to 148 % (LR). The correlation between LMF and local oxidative metabolism during N (r=0.77; n=56) was lost in the postischemic heart during ER and LR. LMF during N and ER were only weakly correlated (r=0.24; n=48), whereas LMF during N and LR correlated well (r=0.87; n=48). It is concluded that the heterogeneous LMF pattern at baseline is maintained in the stunned myocardium whereas that of local oxidative metabolism is not. Apart from the established mechanisms underlying myocardial stunning, a mismatch between local flow and oxidative metabolism might also con-tribute., U. Schwanke, G. Heusch, J. D. Schipke., and Obsahuje bibliografii
According to Fodor, robustness of meaning is an essential aspect of intentionality, and his causal theory of content can account for it. Robustness of meaning refers to the fact that tokenings of a symbol are occasionally caused by instantiations of properties which are not expressed by the symbol. This, according to Fodor, is the source of the phenomenon of misrepresentation. We claim that Fodor’s treatment of content and misrepresentation is infected with a couple of flaws. After criticizing Fodor’s theory of content, we propose a new theory of content which explains how misrepresentation is possible as a result of meaning-forming causation, and extend it to account for the property of robustness of meaning., Podle Fodora je robustnost významu základním aspektem záměrnosti a jeho kauzální teorie obsahu jej může vysvětlit. Robustnost významu se odkazuje na skutečnost, že tokenings symbolu jsou občas způsobeny instancemi vlastností, které nejsou vyjádřeny symbolem. Toto, podle Fodora, je zdrojem fenoménu zkreslení. Tvrdíme, že Fodorova léčba obsahu a zkreslení je infikována několika nedostatky. Poté, co kritizujeme Fodorovu teorii obsahu, navrhujeme novou teorii obsahu, která vysvětluje, jak je zkreslení možné v důsledku příčinných souvislostí, a rozšířit ji tak, aby odpovídala za vlastnost robustnosti významu., and Tevfik Aytekin, Erdinç Sayan
Myšlenkové experimenty jsou populárním argumentačním nástrojem ve vědě i fi losofi i. Jejich kritika ze strany naturalistických a experimentálních fi losofů vedla k vytvoření defl ačních a minimalistických koncepcí, které oslabují epistemickou sílu myšlenkových experimentů a smiřují je s empirismem. Cílem článku je ukázat, že tyto pokusy nepřekonávají hlavní problémy, se kterými se myšlenkové experimenty ve fi losofi i střetávají. Omezená lidská racionalita a představivost znemožňují experimentátorům řešit nereálné scénáře spolehlivým způsobem. Myšlenkové experimenty se ve fi losofi i používají jinak než ve vědě, protože ty pravé jsou obvykle neuskutečnitelné a uzavřené vůči možnosti empirické falsifi kace. Navíc jsou založeny na vadných analogiích a neoprávněně přenášejí důkazní břemeno. Persvazivní úspěšnost myšlenkových experimentů je velmi nízká, a proto nedokáží přispět k řešení fi losofi ckých problémů. Závěrem článku je, že nejběžnější druhy myšlenkových experimentů by měly být odstraněny ze souboru fi losofi ckých metod. and Th ought experiments are popular tools of argumentation in science and philosophy. Th e criticism of these experiments from naturalized and experimental philosophers has led to the formation of defl ationary and minimalist approaches that weaken the epistemic power of thought experiments and reconcile them with empiricism. Th is paper aims to demonstrate that these attempts do not overcome the main problems encountered by thought experiments in philosophy. Th e limits of human rationality and imagination prevent experimenters from solving unrealistic scenarios in a reliable way. Th ought experiments in philosophy are diff erent from science because the real ones usually cannot be implemented and are not open to the possibility of empirical falsifi cation. Moreover, they are based on defective analogies and they shift the burden of proof unfairly. Th e persuasive success of thought experiments is very low; therefore, they cannot contribute to the solution of philosophical problems. Th e paper concludes that the most common types of thought experiments should be removed from the set of philosophical methods.