Philosophical reflexion on art and artistic activity played a very important role in Heidegger’s intellectual development. His famous paper The Birth of an Artistic Work (Der Ursprung des Kunstwerks) marked, after all, the emergence of a fundamental shift in his philosophy. Art, in its specific approach to the world, might aid the working out of a “new beginning” in philosophy since, in Heidegger’s view, the involvement of art in classical metaphysics had been the cause of error. Heidegger found a common voice, at different times, with poetry, fine arts (in one period he was very occupied with Paul Klee) and architecture. Only at the end of his life did he discover for himself the genius of the French painter Paul Cézanne, and he found in him an expression that almost coincided with the expression of his own thoughts. This comparison of Cézanne and Heidegger attempts to uncover other possible connections between the work of these two figures. and Die philosophische Reflexion der Kunst und der künstlerischen Tätigkeit spielte in Heideggers geistiger Entwicklung eine sehr wichtige Rolle. Seine berühmte Abhandlung Der Ursprung des Kunstwerks war sogar Ausgangspunkt eines wesentlichen gedanklichen Schubs in Heideggers Philosophie. Die Kunst mit ihrem spezifischen Ansatz konnte dabei dem gedanklichen Erschließen des sog. neuen Anfangs der Philosophie verhelfen, da deren Verschmelzung mit der klassischen Metaphysik laut Heidegger ein Irrweg war. Heidegger fand Geistesverwandtschaften wechselweise in der Poesie, in der bildenden Kunst (in einer bestimmten Phase beschäftigte er sich intensiv mit dem Werk Paul Klees) oder in der Architektur. Erst gegen Ende seines Lebens entdeckte er für sich das Genie des französischen Malers Paul Cézanne und fand in ihm einen nahezu identischen Ausdruck seiner eigenen Gedanken. Durch einen Vergleich von Cézanne und Heidegger wird versucht, mögliche weitere Zusammenhänge in den Werken dieser beiden Persönlichkeiten aufzudecken.
Author focuses on conception of world as simultaneously constituted and lived by humans in the thought of Karel Kosík and Erazim Kohák. He seeks first an overall interpretation of the thought of Karel Kosík which would bridge the apparent gap between his early Marxist thought and his later essayistic critique of modern age. He comes to the conclusion that both phases of Kosík’s thought share substantive traits and even that Kosík’s later criticism of global capitalism is possible only on the foundations laid in his early works. Susequently the author presents phenomenologically oriented thought of Erazim Kohák which in spite of differences in overall philosophical framework manifests numerous parallels with Kosík’s thought. In Kohák’s work the author traces the problem of values and of valuing in general. On that basis he then analyses Kohák’s idea of home and offers it as a possible answer to the question of anchoring and orientating of lived experience in the dynamics of a world constituted by human being and living.
This review study analyses Martin Nitsche’s monograph devoted to Heidegger’s Contributions to philosophy (Beiträge zur Philosophie), primarily addressing the question of whether Nitsche succeeds in displaying the phenomenological character of the Contributions. It identifies a key step in Nitsche’s interpretation; that is, Heidegger’s shift from emphasising the specific entity of Dasein to emphasising the distinctive “phenomenological” or “relational field”, which is understood as an “ontological locality”. The study focuses on the question of whether it is possible, subsequent to this shift, to preserve the phenomenological character of (Heidegger’s) thought, and it arrives at a negative conclusion in this regard: Heidegger does not offer a phenomenological description - nay, he presents a conceptual, or perhaps even narrative, structure, in which he lays claim to the possibility of speaking from a principled position of (the experienced) “enowning”., Martin Ritter., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
This review study considers Ivan Blecha’s book Bytí a svět. Heidegger v kontextu [Being and the World: Heidegger in Context] chiefly from the point of view of how to read Heidegger after the publication of the first volumes of the Black Notebooks in 2014 and the discussions that have followed in its wake. The peril of contemporary writing about Heidegger is understood by this study as a par-odic interpretive situation. Its basis is a loss of confidence in the governing principles of Heidegger’s seriously intended texts, which manifests itself in the fact that they have inadvertently become a parody of themselves. As a possible response to this situation, Blecha’s method of interpretative confrontations is highlighted. Blecha’s interpretation of Heidegger is subsequently characterized as moving towards a realistic and topological phenomenology., Tato recenzní studie posuzuje knihu Ivana Blechy Bytí a svět. Heidegger v kontextu především z hlediska otázky, jak číst Heideggera po vydání prvních svazků Černých sešitů v roce 2014 a následných diskusích. Riziko současného psaní o Heideggerovi pojmenovává jako paródickou interpretační situaci. Jejím základem je ztráta důvěry v diktum Heideggerových vážně míněných textů, která se projevuje tím, že se nechtěně stávají parodií sebe samých. Jako možná reakce na tuto situaci je vyzdvižena Blechova metoda interpretačních konfrontací. Blechův výklad Heideggera je následně charakterizován jako směřující k realistické a topologické fenomenologii., and Recenzní studie na: Ivan Blecha: Bytí a svět. Heidegger v kontextu
In this text we aim to analyze the Cartesian motifs in the “early” period of Emmanuel Levinas’s thought. Our goal is to explore whether Levinas’s Cartesianism is merely a singular phenomenon, or if it can be set into the wider current of “phenomenologi-cal Cartesianism”. In order to confirm the second possibility, it seems that we must reconstruct the motifs, continuing in Descartes’s specific line of argumentation, which we can directly designate as the “Cartesian way”. These Cartesian motifs can be found in Levinas’s wider context of the issue of subjectivity, and it is these deliberations that form the structure in which the famous formulation of the definition of infinity is made. The first text in which we attempt to identify this general structure that Des-cartes provides for Levinas’s thought and the function that it fulfills in it is Description of Existence. The second motif is Cartesian subjectivity in the book Existence and Existents.
Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of the pathology of perception show “objctive” and “subjective” events have sense for the living body only in relation to its whole equilibrium, that is, to how it organises itself overall and how it thus “meets” those events. If we apply this conception to Husserl’s example of two mutually-touching hands of one body we must then state not that we perceive here a coincidence of certain subjective sensations with certain objective qualities, but rather that my body, in the sense of an object, results from a restructuralisation of the whole field of the body accomplished by the body as the performer of perceptual intentions. The body-object, and for the same reasons also the body-subject, is therefore the product of the analysis of the body in the sense of a field of structuralisation or polarisation, not its original phenomenological “stratum”, as in Husserl. If the body grasps itself as perceptible only by a change of its own structure, inasmuch as it is a certain field of structuralisation, then an “external” thing, which is likewise a pole of such grasping, must belong to the same ontological “field” as the body. Merleau-Ponty’s “flesh”, that is the circularity between questioning of perception and answering of the perceived, is thus a phenomenon taking place beyond the boundary of the body as a singular being. This fact allows the concept of flesh to be extended and to be understood as an “element”, that is, as a dimension in which individual beings only appear
The study is concerned with the issue of philosophical pessimism and escapism in the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Arthur Schopenhauer. I start from Levinas’ early texts On Escape (De l’évasion), Existence and Existents (De l’existence à l’existant ) and Time and the Other (Le temps et l’autre), in which the French phenomenologist holds a strongly pessimistic point of view and where he also formulates a metaphysical need for an “escape from being.” That same tendency – i.e. the need to escape from an inhospitable existential situation – is then examined in Schopenhauer’s seminal work The World as Will and Representation (Die Welt Als Wille Und Vorstellung). In the first part of the study (i), I thematize the moods of boredom (Schopenhauer) and anxiety (Levinas), in which being appears to both authors as inhospitable. I then examine (ii) the metaphysical assumptions of Schopenhauer’s and Levinas’ pessimism and escapism, or more precisely the non-theistic starting points of their philosophical concepts. In the third part (iii), I focus on experiential assumptions, specifically on negative forms of the subject’s experience with the world – i.e. the experience of physical and psychological suffering, existential loneliness and aimlessness. The last part of the study (iv) briefly outlines the various “escape vectors” from being that both philosophers offer: Schopenhauer demarcates the way out of being – towards nothingness – through asceticism, through the gradual mortification of all bodily and spiritual desires; Levinas, to the contrary, holds in his early texts onto the emotion of pleasure [plaisir], whose ecstaticity pointing to transcendence seems to be for him – however inadequate it remains – a pathway towards the exit from being; in his late work, Levinas then finds a solution in the turn towards ethics. and Studie je věnována problematice filosofického pesimismu a eskapismu v díle Emmanuela Lévinase a Arthura Schopenhauera. Vycházím z Lévinasových raných textů O úniku (De l’évasion), Existence a ten, kdo existuje (De l’existence à l’existant) a Čas a jiné (Le temps et l’autre), v nichž francouzský fenomenolog zastává silně pesimistické stanovisko a kde taktéž formuluje metafyzickou potřebu po „úniku z bytí“. Stejnou tendenci – tj. potřebu uniknout z nehostinné existenciální situace – poté sleduji v Schopenhauerově stěžejním spise Svět jako vůle a představa (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung). V první části studie (i) tematizuji nálady nudy (Schopenhauer) a znepokojení (Lévinas), v kterých se oběma autorům bytí vyjevuje coby nehostinné. Následně (ii) zkoumám metafyzické předpoklady Schopenhauerova a Lévinasova pesimismu a eskapismu, respektive tedy non-teistická východiska jejich filosofických koncepcí. Ve třetí části (iii) se soustřeďuji na předpoklady zkušenostní, konkrétně na negativní formy zkušenosti subjektu se světem – tj. zkušenosti fyzického i psychického utrpení, existenciální osamělosti a bezcílnosti. Poslední část studie (iv) stručně načrtává rozličné „vektory úniku“ z bytí, které oba autoři nabízejí: Schopenhauer vytyčuje cestu ven z bytí – směrem k nicotě – skrze asketismus, skrze postupné umrtvování všech tělesných i duševních tužeb. Lévinas se v raných textech naopak upíná k emoci potěšení [plaisir], jejíž extatičnost poukazující k transcendenci se mu zdá být – jakkoli však stále nedostačující – cestou k vystoupení z bytí; v pozdní tvorbě poté Lévinas nachází řešení v obratu k etice.
Práce se zabývá filosofi ckou analýzou vědeckého výzkumu, kterou v polovině minulého století provedla botanička Agnes Arberová. Její koncepce je cenným příspěvkem k otázce kontextu vzniku vědeckého objevu a procesu jeho zdůvodnění v biologických disciplínách. Ve stati se pokusím doložit, že její úvahy mají ráz v zásadě fenomenologický, a proto bude její koncepce interpretována na pozadí úvah Maurice Merleau-Pontyho o tělesné povaze smyslů. Taková interpretace napovídá, že Arberová ve shodě s Merleau-Pontym (při užití odlišné terminologie) uvažuje o fenoménech nikoli jako o objektech, které lze zkoumat odděleně, nýbrž nám představuje fenomenální pole, v němž se fenomény vyjevují v souvislosti s předcházející zkušeností. Orientace v předmětu výzkumu lze vnímat jako otázku rovnováhy, jíž badatel výzkumem aktivně vyhledává. and Th e study refl ects the philosophical analysis of scientifi c research carried out by the botanist Agnes Arber in the 1950s. Her concept entails a valuable contribution to the question of the context of scientifi c discovery and the process of its rationalization in biological disciplines. I will try to show that her considerations are fundamentally phenomenological, and thus the comparison with the thoughts of Maurice Merleau-Ponty on the topic of corporeal nature of senses is useful. Such an interpretation suggests that Arber, similarly to Merleau-Ponty (though using diff erent terminology), considers phenomena not as objects that can be examined separately, but as representing a phenomenal fi eld in which phenomena arise in the context of past experience. According to her, the orientation in the subject of a study is a question of equilibrium, which a researcher actively seeks.