This text is a reflection on the production and reception of the first-of-its-kind anthology of autonomist Marxist texts in Bulgaria, published in 2013. After a brief examination of the anthology’s content, the text focuses on four major “problems of translation” that significantly overdetermined the book’s reception and circulation: what the author calls the problems of semantics, history, politics, and ontology. The article concludes that autonomist Marxism might have a unique role to play in radical conversations in the country and identifies the “work of translation” as a key ingredient in expanding the coalitional possibilities of the left in Eastern Europe.
This review study analyses Martin Nitsche’s monograph devoted to Heidegger’s Contributions to philosophy (Beiträge zur Philosophie), primarily addressing the question of whether Nitsche succeeds in displaying the phenomenological character of the Contributions. It identifies a key step in Nitsche’s interpretation; that is, Heidegger’s shift from emphasising the specific entity of Dasein to emphasising the distinctive “phenomenological” or “relational field”, which is understood as an “ontological locality”. The study focuses on the question of whether it is possible, subsequent to this shift, to preserve the phenomenological character of (Heidegger’s) thought, and it arrives at a negative conclusion in this regard: Heidegger does not offer a phenomenological description - nay, he presents a conceptual, or perhaps even narrative, structure, in which he lays claim to the possibility of speaking from a principled position of (the experienced) “enowning”., Martin Ritter., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Appeals of philosophers to look for new concepts in sciences are being met with a weak response. Limited attention is paid to the relation between synthetic and analytic approach in solving problems of biology. An attempt is presented to open a discussion on a possible role of holism. The term “life manifestations” is used in accordance with phenomenology. Multicellular creatures maintain milieu intérieur to keep an aqueous milieu intracellulair in order to transform the energy of nutrients into the form utilizable for driving cellular life manifestations. Milieu intérieur enables to integrate this kind of manifestations into life manifestations of the whole multicellular creatures. The integration depends on a uniqueness and uniformity of the genome of cells, on their mutual recognition and adherence. The processes of ontogenetic development represent the natural mode of integration of cellular life manifestations. Functional systems of multicellular creatures are being established by organization of integrable cells using a wide range of developmental processes. Starting from the zygote division the new being displays all properties of a whole creature, although its life manifestations vary. Therefore, the whole organism is not only more than its parts, as supposed by holism, but also more than developmental stages of its life manifestations. Implicitly, the units of whole multicellular creature are rather molecular and developmental events than the cells per se. Holism, taking in mind the existence of molecular and space-time biology, could become a guide in looking for a new mode of the combination of analytical and synthetic reasoning in biology., J. Křeček., and Obsahuje bibliografii a bibliografické odkazy
Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude towards the content of our best theories/models recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences. This attitude has important metaphysical dimension. It is committed to the mind-independent existence of the world investigated by the sciences (Chakravartty 2013). In his papers Mathematics and Experience (2009) and Mathematics and Reality (2011) Ladislav Kvasz holds a position of instrumental realism. Kvasz claims that reality is instrumentally constituted and realism issue should be understood as a relation between two languages instead of world-language relation. Kvasz’s instrumental realism also suggests to build up an ontology of distinctions instead of an ontology of fillings. The paper deals with Kvasz’s version of instrumental realism critically and it aims to show that Kvasz’s position is much closer to antirealism than to scientific realism because it does not meet the metaphysical dimension., Vědecký realismus je pozitivním epistemickým postojem k obsahu našich nejlepších teorií / modelů, které doporučují víru v pozorovatelné i nepozorovatelné aspekty světa popsané vědami. Tento postoj má důležitý metafyzický rozměr. To je oddané mysli-nezávislá existence světa vyšetřovaného vědami (Chakravartty 2013). V příspěvcích Matematika a zkušenosti (2009) a Matematika a realita (2011) zaujímá Ladislav Kvasz pozici instrumentálního realismu. Kvasz tvrdí, že realita je instrumentálně konstituovaná a otázka realismu by měla být chápána jako vztah mezi dvěma jazyky místo vztahu světového jazyka. Kvaszův instrumentální realismus také navrhuje vytvořit ontologii rozdílů místo ontologie výplní., and Pavol Labuda
The discussion study takes as its starting point the thinking, which Professor Šmajs and others presented in Filosofický časopis 6, 2013 on evolutionary ontology. The author shows an enduring aspect of evolutionary ontology: ontology as the product of human culture attains to knowledge that has the seeming character of objective truth - it thus expresses the true nature of the ontic order of nature. This is not, however, the usual nonsense of inconsistent philosophy. The author of the text identifies as lying behind the step Kantian and Hegelian strategies which make possible this shift from the order of culture to the order of nature. These strategies are (i) a sign of the grounding of Professor Šmajs´ ideas in early-modern thinking; and (ii) they are the cause of a strongly anthropocentric attitude, which unwittingly influences the system of evolutionary ontology. At the end of the study, the author points to the fact that it would be more appropriate for evolutionary ontology if its proponents were able to give up their early-modern argumentative approach, and thus rid themselves of their strong anthropocentrism. In this way they would be able to avoid the conceptual conflict which makes evolutionary ontology "frozen" from within., Radim Šíp., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Článek se pokouší v Lévinasově rané filosofii odhalit náznaky, v pozdní tvorbě již plně rozvinuté, etické koncepce bytí-pro-druhého. První texty, jež jsou stále do značné míry formované Heideggerovou fundamentální ontologií, staví do popředí fenomén neosobního bytí – ono je [il y a]. Ukážeme, že mimo čistě ontologický záběr můžeme v Lévinasově postulaci pojmu identifikovat intence jednak existenciální, jednak etické. Nálada hrůzy, vyvěrající ze zkušenosti subjektu s il y a, totiž vrhá individuální vědomí v existenciální otřes, jenž zpřístupňuje možnost etického obratu. Toto existenciálně-etické prizma v první řadě utváří ucelený narativ, spojující Lévinasovy rané ontologické úvahy s etickou koncepcí rozvinutou v pozdní tvorbě, zadruhé pak poukazuje na význačnou formativní funkci nálad v existenciální fenomenologii. Především nálada hrůzy se ukazuje jako způsob, jak negativně fundovat i motivovat etické smýšlení., The article attempts to discover, in Levinas’ early philosophy, the first indications of what by his later writings would become a fully developed, ethical conception of being-for-the other. The first texts, which were in large measure shaped by Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, place the phenomenon of impersonal being – il y a (there is) – into the forefront. We show that, besides a purely ontological view, we can in Levinas’ postulation of the concept identify intentions that are both existential and ethical. The mood of horror, resulting from the subject’s experience with il y a, throws individual consciousness into an existential upheaval, opening up the possibility for an ethical turn. This existential-ethical prism forms, first of all, a comprehensive narrative, combining Levinas’ early ontological thinking with the ethical concept that he developed in his late work and, secondly, points to a significant formative function of moods in existential phenomenology. Above all, the mood of horror is showing itself to be a way to negatively serve and motivate ethical attitudes., and Notre étude essaye découvrir des signes du concept éthique de l’être pour autrui contenus déjà dans la première philosophie de Lévinas mais pleinement développés ultérieurement. Les textes premiers, influencés considérablement par l’ontologie fondamentale de Heidegger, mettent en avance le phénomène de l’être impersonnel – il y a. Nous allons montrer qu’en dehors de prise proprement ontologique dans la formulation première de ce concept par Lévinas on peut y identifier les intentions à la fois existentielles et éthiques. L’ambiance de l’horreur provenant de l’expérience du sujet avec il y a ébranle existentiellement la conscience individuelle en l’ouvrant à la Kehre éthique. Ce regard éthico-existentiel formule en premier lieu un récit complet liant les premières réflexions ontologiques de Lévinas à un concept éthique développé dans son travail ultérieur, il attire attention ensuite à l’importante fonction formative des ambiances dans la phénoménologie existentielle. C’est en effet surtout l’ambiance de l’horreur qui se révèle en tant que moyen permettant une fondation et motivation négatives de la réflexion éthique.
Merleau-Ponty holds that Husserl's descriptions of the body go beyond the conceptual framework of subject-object ontology to which his philosophy is usually thought to conform. Merleau-Ponty says of is own philosophy that it is founded on the circularity in the body; that is, on the fact that the perceptivity and perception of the body are, from the ontological point of view, one and the same. The inseparability of these two aspects of the body he calls flesh (chair). According to Husserl, I perceive my body such that in a certain perceived object I also understand sensations roused by the perception of that object - I observe the "consequential parallel" between two series of objective and subjective phenomena. Husserl argues that the unity of the body should be expressed as a double unity, and the body as a subject-object. In this article I analyse Husserl's example of two hands of the same body touching each other and, in agreement with Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, I attempt to show that the body can appear to itself as an object only on the basis of a differentiation of the body as of a certain field of perceiving. The body as a double unity of subject and object is therefore grounded in the body as a pre-objective and pre-subjective field; that is, in flesh as Merleau-Ponty understands it. This is also the point of departure for and original conception of ontology as we find it in his later philosophy., Jan Halák., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
The work tackles the question of wheter, and in what sense, Patočka's phenomenology is first philosophy and strict science. It does this by considering the problem ot the relationship of phenomenology, as a doctrine about appearing, to epistomology and to ontology. After an analysis of the conceptation of phenomenology which Patočka works with his dissertation and habilitation on the natural world, the study moves on to Patočka's late thinking, especially to the conception of an "asubjective phenomenology". The interpretation distinguishes various phenomenological approaches which are intertwined in the project of asubjective phenomenology, and its points to their weak points. Finally it identifies an acceptable conception of phenomenology in that which is presented in Patočka's lecture cycle Tělo, společenství, svět (Body, Community, Language, World). and Martin Ritter.
Ontology is widely used in the computer domain to structure concepts that represent a view of world nowadays, which could formally specify semantic relationship among the terms. In this paper, we present coordination between agent crawlers based on ontology in Topic Specific Search Engines, and we try to measure understanding among them, relying on Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) instead of comparing the terms only. In literature, most papers on concept similarity in FCA are based on two different concepts in the same concept lattice, and whereas there is very little research related to different concept lattices or even different agents. We propose a novel method on concept similarity for computing the Concept-Concept similarity, the Concept-Ontology similarity and the Ontology-Ontology similarity, and at last we can deduce understanding among agent crawlers. Finally, we can guide the crawlers effectively in our Search Engine.
The aim of the paper is to argue that the ontological setting of objects in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is a version of structural realism. According to our plan, one of the opening statements of the Tractatus - The world is the totality of facts, not of things - introduces structuralist perspective: structures are superior to their constituents. However, structuralists use the notion ''superior'' in various senses, but this paper argues that the Tractatus places its objects within the framework of ontic structural realism in its moderate form. That form puts structures and individuals on the same ontological footing. Such thesis contradicts traditional object-ontology that dominates Tractarian literature., Cílem práce je argumentovat, že ontologické nastavení objektů ve Wittgensteinově Tractatus je verzí strukturálního realismu. Podle našeho plánu, jeden z úvodních výroků Tractatus - Svět je souhrn faktů, ne věcí - zavádí strukturalistickou perspektivu: struktury jsou nadřazené jejich složkám. Nicméně, strukturalisté používají pojem ''nadřazený'' v různých smyslech, ale tento papír argumentuje, že Tractatus umístí jeho objekty uvnitř rámce ontic strukturálního realismu v jeho mírné formě. Tato forma staví struktury a jednotlivce na stejné ontologické základy. Tato práce je v rozporu s tradiční objektovou ontologií, která dominuje v literární literatuře., and Martin Schmidt