This study focuses on modeling hydrological responses of shallow hillslope soil in a headwater catchment. The research is conducted using data from the experimental site Uhlířská in Jizera Mountains, Czech Republic. To compare different approaches of runoff generation modeling, three models were used: (1) onedimensional variably saturated flow model S1D, based on the dual-continuum formulation of Richards’ equation; (2) zero-dimensional nonlinear morphological element model GEOTRANSF; and (3) semidistributed model utilizing the topographic index similarity assumption - TOPMODEL. Hillslope runoff hydrographs and soil water storage variations predicted by the simplified catchment scale models (GEOTRANSF and TOPMODEL) were compared with the respective responses generated by the more physically based local scale model S1D. Both models, GEOTRANSF and TOPMODEL, were found to predict general trends of hydrographs quite satisfactorily; however their ability to correctly predict soil water storages and inter-compartment fluxes was limited. and Studie je zaměřena na modelování hydrologické reakce mělké svahové půdy v pramenné části povodí Nisy, k výzkumu byla použita data z experimentálního povodí Uhlířská. Porovnání různých konceptuálních představ modelování odtoku bylo uskutečněno pro: (1) jednorozměrný model proměnlivě nasyceného proudění S1D; (2) model založený na bezrozměrném nelineárním morfologickém prvku - GEOTRANSF a (3) semi-distribuovaný model využívající principu podobnosti na základě topografického indexu - TOPMODEL. Hydrogramy odtoku ze svahu a změny zásob vody v půdě vypočtené zjednodušenými modely GEOTRANSF a TOPMODEL byly porovnány s odpovídajícími odezvami fyzikálně založeného modelu S1D. Oba modely, GEOTRANSF i TOPMODEL, byly poměrně úspěšné v předpovědi základních trendů hydrogramů odtoku, jejich schopnost správně předpovídat zásoby vody v půdě a toky mezi nimi však byla omezená.
In this paper we focused on the history of floods and extreme flood frequency analysis of the upper Danube River at Bratislava. Firstly, we briefly describe the flood marks found on the Danube River in the region of Bratislava, Slovakia, and provide an account of the floods’ consequences. Secondly, we analyzed the annual maximum discharge series for the period 1876–2012, including the most recent flood of June 2013. Thirdly, we compare the values of T-year design discharge computed with and without incorporating the historic floods (floods of the years 1501, 1682, and 1787 into the 138-year series of annual discharge peaks). There are unfortunately only a few historic flood marks preserved in Bratislava, but there are very important and old marks in neighbouring Hainburg and other Austrian cities upstream to Passau. The calculated T-year maximum discharge of the Danube at Bratislava for the period 1876-2010 without and with historic flood values have been compared. Our analysis showed that without incorporating the historic floods from the years 1501, 1682, and 1787 the 1000-year discharge calculated only with data from the instrumented period 1876- 2013 is 14,188 m3 s -1 , and it is lower compared to the 1000-year discharge of 14,803 m3 s -1 when the three historic floods are included. In general, the T-year discharge is higher throughout the whole spectrum of T-year discharges (10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500-year discharge) when the three historic floods are included. Incorporating historic floods into a time series of maximum annual discharge seems to exert a significant effect on the estimates of low probability floods. This has important implications for flood managements and estimation of flood design discharge.
The hydrological modeling can be considered as one of major possibilities for the quantification and qualification of changes in hydrological processes. For the application the WetSpa (Water and Energy Transfer between Soil, Plant and Atmosphere) model calibrated for the Hornad River Basin have been chosen. WetSpa simulates the most important hydrological processes in a river basin, such as runoff, actual evapotranspiration, groundwater recharge, and hydrographs at selected locations in the stream network, etc. The application have been done in the frame of the scientific objectives of the Tisza River Project - Reallife scale integrated catchment modelling for supporting water-related environmental management decisions (5th Framework Programme EU on Research and Technology Development). The Department of Hydrology and Hydraulic Engineering, the research unit of the Free University of Brussels (VUB) in cooperation with Slovak Hydrometeorological Institute (SHMÚ) and Water Research Institute in Bratislava (VÚVH) were responsible for calibration, validation and application of the WetSpa model in the Hornad River basin. and Pri hodnotení vplyvu využívania krajiny na priebeh povodní v povodí Hornádu sa aplikoval model WetSpa. Fyzikálne založený model bol vyvinutý na simuláciu a predpoveď prenosu vody a energie medzi pôdou, rastlinstvom a atmosférou (Water and Energy Transfer between Soil, Plants and Atmosphere- WetSpa). Modelové riešenie sa použilo v úlohe 5. rámcového programu EÚ ''Projekt rieky Tisa - integrované modelovanie povodia na podporu rozhodovacieho procesu v oblasti vody a prostredia od nej závislého''. Zodpovedným pracoviskom pre vytvorenie a aplikovanie modelu bolo Oddelenie hydrológie a hydrotechniky Univerzity Vrije v Bruseli. Úlohou spolupracujúcich organizácií zo SR (Slovenský hydrometeorologický ústav a Výskumný ústav vodného hospodárstva) bolo zabezpečiť a poskytnúť vstupné údaje a konzultácie pri kalibrácii modelu a jeho aplikácii.
The article analyses the terms ''value'' and ''explanation'' as used in ethical studies, offers a critique of this usage and an alternative, pragmatically oriented semantics of ethical terms, based on the illocutionary act of judging. The term ''value'' is supposed to describe a super-predicate common to both ethical and aesthetical value judgments. However, the traditional over-reliance on the copulative predication and the idea that language describes reality lead to a one-sided view of ethical terms, and a construction of sentences like ''The intentional torturing of little children is morally wrong'', whose pragmatic function, and consequently meaning, is very unclear. If, on the other hand, we take as our paradigm the act of judging (in the literal sense of a judge presiding over a case) we will be able to sketch a new, lighter ethics which, admittedly, falls short of the traditional demands placed on this discipline, but whose semantics is closer to the actual words used in expressing approval and disapproval., Článek analyzuje pojmy ,,hodnota'' a ,,vysvětlení'' používané v etických studiích, nabízí kritiku tohoto užití a alternativní, pragmaticky orientovanou sémantiku etických pojmů, založenou na iluminačním aktu soudnictví. Termín ,,hodnota'' má popisovat super-predikát společný jak pro etické, tak pro estetické hodnoty. Avšak tradiční přehnané spoléhání se na kopulační predikci a myšlenka, že jazyk popisuje realitu, vede k jednostrannému pohledu na etické pojmy a konstrukci vět jako ,,úmyslné mučení malých dětí je morálně špatné'', jehož pragmatická funkce a tudíž význam, je velmi nejasný. Pokud na druhou stranu vezmeme jako naše paradigma akt posuzování (v doslovném smyslu soudce předsedajícího případu), budeme schopni načrtnout novou, lehčí etiku,což, uznávám, nenaplňuje tradiční požadavky kladené na této disciplíny, ale jejichž sémantika je blíž ke skutečné slova používaná v projeví souhlas a nesouhlas., and Marek Tomeček
Recently the account of free will proposed by Harry Frankfurt has come under attack. It has been argued that Frankfurt’s notion of wholeheartedness is in conflict with prevalent intuitions about free will and should be abandoned. I will argue that empirical data from choice blindness experiments can vindicate Frankfurt’s notion of wholeheartedness. The choice blindness phenomenon exposes that individuals fail to track their own decisions and readily take ownership of, and confabulate reasons for, decisions they did not make. Traditionally this has been taken to be problem for the notion of free will. I argue that Frankfurt’s account does not face this problem. Instead, choice blindness can be fruitfully applied to it, and vice versa. Frankfurt’s notion of wholeheartedness, I suggest, delineates the range of the choice blindness effect. This makes wholeheartedness a useful meta-theoretical concept for choice blindness research. I conclude that, pace the recent criticism, wholeheartedness is a useful notion and should not be abandoned., Nedávno byl napaden útok na svobodnou vůli, který navrhl Harry Frankfurt. To bylo argumentoval, že Frankfurt je představa o bezstarostnosti je v konfliktu s převládajícími intuicemi o svobodné vůli a should být opuštěný. Tvrdím, že empirická data z vybraných experimentů slepoty mohou obhájit frankfurtský pojem celistvosti. Fenomén slepé selekce odhaluje, že jednotlivci nedokážou sledovat svá vlastní rozhodnutí a snadno se chopit odpovědnosti za rozhodnutí, která neučinili. Tradičně to bylo považováno za problém pro pojetí svobodné vůle. Tvrdím, že frankfurtský účet tento problém neřeší. Namísto toho může být na něj vhodně aplikována slepota a naopak. Navrhuji, aby frankfurtský pojem celistvosti vymezil rozsah efektu slepoty. To činí z celého srdce užitečný meta teoretický koncept pro výběr výzkumu slepoty. Uzavírám to,tempo nedávné kritiky, bezúhonnost je užitečná představa a neměla by být opuštěna., and Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup
My aim in this paper is to illuminate the question of how vicarious feeling is possible, by advancing our understanding of vicarious emotions. I address this problem by classifying the reactive attitude into two categories: the vicarious, and the self-reactive. I argue that guilt is constitutively tied to personal responsibility and that the appropriateness of vicarious feeling of group harm derives from a reflection on the appropriateness of our own reactive attitude, that is, vicarious reactive attitude, e.g., indignation or outrage.
In theories of cognition, 4E approaches to cognition are seen to refrain from employing robust representations in contrast to Predictive Process, where such posits are utilized extensively. Despite this notable dissimilarity with regard to pos-its they employ in explaining certain cognitive phenomena, it has been repeatedly argued that they are in fact compatible. As one may expect, these arguments mostly end up contending either that Predictive Process is actually nonrepresentational or that 4E approaches are representational. In this paper, I will argue that such arguments are inadequate for the indicated purpose for several reasons: the variety of representational posits in Predictive Process, the diverse attitudes of practitioners of 4E approaches toward representations and the unconstrained use of the term “representation” in cognitive science. Hence, here I will try to demonstrate that any single argument, if it depends on representational 4E approaches or nonrepresentational Predictive Process, falls short of encompassing this heterogeneity in pertinent debates. Then, I will analyze similar arguments provided by Jacob Hohwy and Michael Kirchhoff to illustrate how destructive this seemingly ordinary criticism is.
The first part of the paper deals with the key question of the Searle-Derrida debate, namely, with the question of conceptual ''exactness'' and applicability of concepts to facts. I argue that Derrida makes a strict distinction between the exactness in the realm of concepts and the exactness in the realm of facts. Supposing that it is not correct to argue against him - as Searle does - that concepts cannot be exact because there are no strict boundaries between facts. The second part of the paper deals with a distinction used by John Searle: The distinction between linguistic meaning and speaker’s meaning. According to Searle linguistic meaning is constituted outside a particular context of use whereas speaker’s meaning is embedded in a particular situation. I argue this distinction is problematic as far as any meaning is constituted in a particular utterance and in a particular context of use., První část práce se zabývá klíčovou otázkou debaty Searle-Derrida, konkrétně otázkou konceptuální ,,přesnosti'' a aplikovatelnosti konceptů na fakta. Tvrdím, že Derrida rozlišuje mezi přesností v oblasti pojmů a přesností v oblasti faktů. Předpokládejme, že není správné argumentovat proti němu - jak to dělá Searle -, že pojmy nemohou být přesné, protože mezi fakty neexistují striktní hranice. Druhá část práce se zabývá rozlišením, které používá John Searle: Rozlišení mezi jazykovým významem a významem mluvčího. Podle Searle je lingvistický význam vytvořen mimo konkrétní kontext použití, zatímco význam mluvčího je zakotven v určité situaci., and Tomáš Koblížek