In this paper, I aim to do three things. First, I introduce the distinction between the Uniqueness Thesis (U) and what I call the Conditional Uniqueness Thesis (U*). Second, I argue that despite their official advertisements, some prominent uniquers effectively defend U* rather than U. Third, some influential considerations that have been raised by the opponents of U misfire if they are interpreted as against U*. The moral is that an appreciation of the distinction between U and U* helps to clarify the contours of the uniqueness debate and to avoid a good deal of talking past each other.
David Miller v pracích Critical Rationalism (1994) a Out of Error (2006) se jako jeden z mála Popperových žáků snaží nejen o vysvětlení a obhájení Popperova kritického racionalismu, ale zároveň i o jeho další rozvinutí. Millerovo znovunastolení kritického racionalismu ovšem předpokládá, že k racionálnímu jednání není třeba žádných „dobrých důvodů“, ale jen argumentů. Uvedená stať se zaměřuje právě na tuto otázku existence tzv. „dobrých důvodů“ ve spojení s racionalitou a racionálním rozhodováním a ukazuje, že Millerův požadavek neexistence „dobrých důvodů“ je nejen příliš radikální, ale i nepřijatelný z hlediska Popperova nebo Musgravova pojetí kritického racionalismu. and David Miller in his books Critical Rationalism (1994) and Out of Error (2006), as one of the few Popper’s students, tries not only to explain and defend Popper’s critical rationalism but also to develop it further. Miller’s restatement of critical rationalism, however, assumes that no “good reason,” but only arguments are needed for rational action. Th is article focuses precisely on this question of the existence of the so-called “good reasons” in connection with rationality and rational decision-making and shows that Miller’s demand for the absence of “good reasons” is not only too radical but also unacceptable in terms of Popper’s or Musgrave’s concepts of critical rationalism.
I consider and reject a specific criticism advanced by Korsgaard against virtue ethics and epistemology when these are conceived with the help of what she calls the image of the “Good Dog.” I consider what virtue ethics and epistemology would look like if the Good Dog picture of virtues were largely correct. I argue that attention to the features that make Korsgaard undermine the usefulness of virtues when conceived along the lines of the Good Dog picture reveals the opposite of what she claims. On the Good Dog picture, virtue ethics and epistemology are seen as more promising approaches to rationality than Korsgaard’s own advocacy of reflection.
This paper aims to assess current theoretical findings on the origin of coordination by salience and suggests a way to clarify the existing framework. The main concern is to reveal how different coordination mechanisms rely on specific epistemic aspects of reasoning. The paper highlights the fact that basic epistemic assumptions of theories diverge in a way that makes them essentially distinctive. Consequently, recommendations and predictions of the traditional views of coordination by salience are, in principle, based on the processes related to the agent’s presumptions regarding the cognitive abilities of a co-player. This finding implies that we should consider these theories as complementary, and not competitive, explanations of the same phenomenon.
The aim of the article is to apply the concept of the hermeneutical circle to the position of a sociologist. The hermeneutical problem in sociology is exemplified by research into social action that examines how sociological understanding captures meanings attributed to the action by the actors themselves. Although several distinguished theorists have already introduced the idea of hermeneutics into sociology, none of them pursued the topic of the hermeneutical circle in detail. This article applies the hermeneutical circle to sociology through the concepts of ‘pre-understanding’ and the ‘fusion of horizons’. The analysis results in the acknowledgement of epistemological pluralism in sociology and leads to the conclusion that the justification of truth in sociology cannot be simply a matter of correspondence-based verification, but must involve a form of decision-making about true knowledge within an intersubjective sociological rationality.
Popper opakovaně tvrdí, že aby teorie mohla rozvinout svůj plný potenciál, musí kritické fázi testování předcházet krátká dogmatická fáze. Někdy zachází Popper ještě dál a uznává dokonce nezbytnost dogmatismu pro rozvinutí kritického myšlení. To jsou znepokojivá tvrzení, která podrývají Popperův metodologický princip falsifi kace. Kritický racionalismus je založen na nesmiřitelném postoji k dogmatismu z logických důvodů (justifi kace je logicky neplatná), z evolučních důvodů (dogmatismus nepřispívá k růstu vědění) i z ideologických důvodů (dogmatismus je typický pro totalitární režimy). Popper není schopen defi novat žádné objektivní měřítko, jak by se měl dogmatismus správně dávkovat, a tak otvírá prostor pro jeho nekontrolovatelné šíření. Kritičnost tak přestává být nekompromisním normativním principem a konstitutivním rysem racionality. and At various occasions Popper states that in order for a theory to show its strength “certain amount” of dogmatism must precede the critical testing phase. He even argues that dogmatism is a necessary precondition of criticism. Th ese are alarming statements, undermining Popper’s methodological imperative of falsifi - cation. Critical rationalism is based on a strict opposition to dogmatism for logical reasons (justifi cation is impossible), for evolutionary reasons (justifi cation blocks the growth of knowledge), and for ideological reasons (dogmatism encourages totalitarianism). Popper cannot provide any objective criterion defi ning the proper dosage of dogmatism and thus opens doors to its uncontrolled expansion. Criticism thus ceases to be the non-negotiable normative principle and the inviolable standard of rationality.